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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Downstream channel allowances, also referred to simply as ‗channel allowances‘, 
occur when a seller makes a payment to a downstream channel partner, typically a 
buying firm, in exchange for distribution of a product or service.  There is an ongoing 
debate as to the advantages and disadvantages of this pay-to-play practice. Although 
scholars have examined this phenomenon from both perspectives, very little, if any, work 
has focused on the unintended consequences that such payments may have in an 
exchange context.  I propose the following dissertation as the initial step in 
understanding the undermining effect that downstream channel allowances may have on 
variables which are important to sales managers, salespeople, and the customers they 
serve. 
 
BACKGROUND  
 The practice of sellers making payments to customers in order to gain access to a 
distribution channel is widespread.  Therefore, this research is relevant to multiple 
industries and academic disciplines.  Specifically, this research has relevance to the fields 
of marketing, economics, public policy, and ethics.  Further, our current state of 
knowledge regarding these payments between channel partners is severely lacking.  In 
particular, there is an absence of any guidance as to how these types of payments may be 
used effectively by selling firms. My research takes the initial step toward addressing this 
knowledge gap by investigating the unintended consequences of payments such as 
downstream channel allowances which may be present in the customer-salesperson 
exchange.  
To date, scholars have examined the general practice of slotting fees (e.g., Bone, 
France, and Riley 2006), the ongoing debate over the channel effects of slotting fees 
(e.g., Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000; Marx and Schaffer 2007), the relevance of 
slotting fees to new product development (e.g., Rao and Mahi 2003; Sudhir and Rao 
2006; Desiraju 2001; Richards and Patterson 2004), and the case of slotting fees from a 
public policy perspective (e.g., Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach 2002).  However, 
empirical research on slotting fees remains scarce.  What knowledge is available tends to 
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focus on the case of powerful retailers requiring manufacturers to pay slotting fees to 
gain distribution of a new product.  Little, if any, effort has been put into investigating 
the incidence of manufacturers wanting to pay slotting fees as a way to gain product 
distribution, develop brands, build market share, grow top line revenue, and improve 
bottom line results.  Additionally, little is known about how and to what extent slotting 
fees may be factored into marketing strategy and sales processes.   
There are more unanswered questions about slotting fees than could possibly be 
addressed here.  Thus, the focus of this study is on a portion of the many questions which 
remain unanswered.  Specifically, do firms undermine the efforts of salespeople when 
they use slotting fees as a component of marketing strategy even if these fees are not 
required by customers?  What is the impact of applying slotting fees from a financial 
perspective (e.g., selling-firm financial outcomes) and from a relational perspective (e.g., 
salesperson-owned loyalty)?  These questions will be systematically addressed by 
conducting a comprehensive literature review, analyzing secondary firm-level data, 
collecting survey data to bridge any gaps left after the initial data analysis, and using 
cognitive evaluation theory to guide the overall research effort.  The findings of this 
study are certain to hold implications for scholars and practitioners concerned with 
marketing strategy and the role of slotting fees.  Future research on slotting fees will 
continue to advance our understanding of this practice in marketing strategy as well as 
address issues relevant to ethics and public policy. 
 
DOWNSTREAM CHANNEL ALLOWANCES CONCEPTUALIZATION 
In a traditional customer-seller exchange a product or service flows from the seller to the 
customer while financial consideration flows from the customer back to the seller.  This 
is a common type of exchange studied by marketing scholars.  This type of exchange 
may take place between a business and a consumer or between two businesses.  In the 
business-to-business exchange the practice of sellers paying customers to buy; or from a 
different perspective, sellers paying customers in order to sell; has become increasingly 
common.  See figure 1-1 below. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1 
Customer-Seller Exchanges 
 
Traditional Exchange vs. Pay-to-Play Exchange 
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This pay-to-play phenomenon goes by many names across multiple industries.  
Specific to the marketing literature, this practice is referred to as slotting fees, display 
fees, failure fees, pay-to-stay fees, presentation fees, and merchandising allowances 
among many others.   However, there is a fundamental problem with using multiple 
descriptives, often in a generic way, to describe all such pay-to-play practices.   
First, the most common of these terms, slotting fee, is outdated.  Slotting fee was 
originally used in reference to manufacturers paying for ‗slots‘ in the warehouse of a 
distributor.  There were costs associated with adding products in the warehouse so a 
slotting fee was charged to the manufacturer as a way of transferring those costs.  Today, 
the term slotting fee is used to describe many different arrangements such as paying for 
shelf space in a retail store or paying for product placement on a website.   
Second, the term has become outdated from a legal perspective.  For example, 
when the Federal Trade Commission (2003) questioned retail customers regarding the 
practice of slotting fees, customers frequently stated that their company did not charge 
nor accept slotting fees.  While technically true, many of these companies did extract 
payments from sellers in other ways such as promotional and advertising allowances, 
failure fees, or charge-backs.  While these practices are not technically ―slotting fees‖, 
they are effectively the same.  That is, financial consideration being paid by the seller to 
the customer in exchange for either initial or continued access to a distribution channel. 
 Third, these fees and allowances are not solely being charged by customers to 
sellers.  In fact, manufacturing firms frequently offer payment, in these many forms, as a 
way to gain access within a channel of distribution.  For example, a consumer goods 
manufacturer may offer a merchandising allowance to a retailer in exchange for 
distribution or additional space in the retailer‘s store.  Similarly, an appliance 
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manufacturer may offer payment, in some form, to a home builder in exchange for 
placement of the manufacturer‘s appliances in model homes.  The possible forms of 
payment are virtually endless and the exchange partners too numerous to count when 
attempting to investigate this pervasive phenomenon.  Refer to table 1.1 for a sample of 
the many different definitions used to define slotting fees and related practices. 
 Thus, in an effort to combine all of these various payments into one concept and 
to allow for concise study, I propose the conceptualization of downstream channel 
allowances to describe any form of financial consideration flowing from a seller to a 
customer with the intended outcome of gaining access to a distribution channel 
controlled by the downstream channel partner (i.e., the customer).  The focus of this 
dissertation is on the application of downstream channel allowances on the form 
monetary payment, as opposed in-kind gifts for example. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.1 
Common Definitions of Slotting Allowances and Related Practices 
 
Author(s)     Definition 
 
Aalberts and Jennings (1999, p. 207)  ―Slotting fees are fees manufacturers pay to retailers in order to obtain retail shelf    
space.‖ 
 
Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000)  slotting fees and allowances' have been broadened to describe a family of marketing 
practices that involve payments and other incentives (e.g., free products or services) 
given by manufacturers to persuade downstream channel members to stock, display, and 
support their products (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000 from Wilkie, Desrochers, 
and Gundlach 2002) 
 
Bone, France, and Riley (2006, p. 224)  ―Slotting fees, also known as slotting allowances, are up-front, lump-sum payments from 
manufacturers to retailers to obtain new product distribution.‖ 
 
Cannon and Bloom (1991, p. 168)  ―A slotting allowance is a one-time payment paid by a manufacturer to a grocer or  
wholesaler as part of the terms required to distribute a new item.‖ 
 
―Slotting allowances differ from more traditional forms of trade promotion in three ways. 
First, slotting allowances are usually negotiated, and therefore vary from customer to 
customer. Second, the payments are often lump-sum, up-front cash, not based on actual 
purchases. The guidelines set forth by Robinson-Patman Act Section 2(d) require that 
promotional allowances be paid on proportionally equal terms across all customers.  
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TABLE 1.1, CONTINUED 
 
This has usually meant that trade allowances are based on actual dollar or unit volume 
purchased.  Third, the magnitude of individual payments can be much greater than other 
forms of trade promotion.‖ 
 
Desiraju (2001, p. 336)   ―(Slotting) allowances are the controversial fees charged by retailers to allow  
shelf  space for new products.‖ 
 
 Gundlach and Bloom (1998, p. 174)  ―(Slotting allowances are) payments to retailers for stocking and displaying new  
products, or for other support services…‖ 
 
 Israilevich (2004, p. 143)   ―Slotting allowances are lump-sum, up-front payments from a manufacturer to a  
retailer to have a new stock-keeping unit (SKU) carried by the retailer and placed on its 
shelves.‖  
 
―Pay-to-stay fees are charged for existing products to ensure continued presence on the 
shelf for some further period.‖ 
 
Kelly (1991, p. 187)    ―A slotting allowance is a fee paid by a grocery manufacturer to a grocery retailer  
at the time of the introduction of a product to the retailer's inventory, ostensibly to 
reimburse the retailer for the initial expenses it incurs by adopting the product.‖ 
 
 Laraviere and Padmanabhan (1997, p. 112) ―Slotting allowances (are) lump sum transfers from manufacturers to retailers for  
carrying new products.‖ 
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TABLE 1.1, CONTINUED 
 
Marx and Schaffer (2007, p. 823)  ―Upfront payments are fixed fees paid by manufacturers to retailers ostensibly to  
obtain access to shelf space, defray upfront costs, and support downstream promotional 
activities.‖  
 
―The term is descriptive of when these payments are actually made, that is, at the time the 
contract is signed and/or at the beginning of each year if the length of the contract spans 
several years.‖  
 
―Slotting allowances belong to this class of payments, as do so-called listing fees, pay- 
to-stay fees, and street money.‖ 
 
Rao and Mahi (2003, p. 246)    ―These allowances are lump-sum, up-front transfer payments from manufacturer  
to retailer when the manufacturer launches a new product.‖ 
 
Rennhoff (2004, p. 1)    ―Merchandising allowances are fees manufacturers pay retailers to encourage  
them to allocate certain in-store promotional activities to the manufacturers‘  
brand(s).‖ 
 
Shaffer (1991, p. 120)    ―Slotting allowances, also known as street money or placement allowances, are  
fees paid by manufacturers to obtain retailer patronage. They may be cash gifts or 
payments in kind, such as cases of free goods.‖ 
 
Sudhir and Rao (2006, p. 137)   ―Slotting allowances are lump-sum payments by manufacturers to 
retailers for stocking new products.‖ 
 
8
      
 
 
TABLE 1.1, CONTINUED 
 
Sullivan (1997, p. 461)    ―Slotting allowances are fixed fees paid to retailers by manufacturers in return for  
stocking new products on a trial basis.‖ 
 
Wang (2006, p. 68)     ―Slotting allowances, also referred to as slotting fees, refer to the fees that  
manufacturers pay retailers in order to have their products being carried by the retailers. 
These fees include shelf-space fees, display fees, pay-to-stay fees, failure fees, etc.‖ 
 
White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000, p. 291)  ―…slotting fees typically refer to up-front cash payments to retailers for accepting new 
products, while introductory allowances reflect free or discounted orders for new 
products.‖ 
 
―The main difference between the two are that slotting fees are negotiated in private, tend 
to vary across manufacturers, and are not based on actual purchases, while introductory 
allowances are based on purchases and tend to be consistent across manufacturers.‖ 
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RESEARCH GAP 
Offering support for the notion that slotting fee occurrences are becoming more 
widespread, Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach (2002) find that the practice continued to 
grow throughout the 1990‘s.  Further, the authors find that this practice has moved 
beyond the grocery industry and into other areas of the marketplace such as airports, 
internet commerce, and textiles.  With no resolution to the opposing schools of thought, 
and now a more widespread application of these payments, the debate over this practice 
has intensified.  In a review of court rulings and case law, Balto (2002) suggests that 
interest in slotting allowances and related practices will continue to grow among scholars 
as well as public policy makers.  However, knowledge gaps remain and scholarly work in 
this area is far from over. 
 One fruitful area of inquiry involves the unintended consequences that result from 
these payments.  Beyond discriminatory and exclusionary effects which have legal 
implications and questions of fairness and equity within the marketplace which have 
ethical implications, there are questions to be answered regarding the effect that these 
payments have on the selling process itself.  The current research proposal addresses a 
portion of this by asking whether or not downstream channel allowances harm a 
salesperson‘s ability to persuade a customer through influence methods and/or diminish 
the loyalty a customer holds toward the salesperson. 
 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
The current study will explore the effect of customer‘s perceptions of salesperson control 
over downstream channel allowances in a business-to-business sales setting.  Survey 
research will be used as the method in gathering data from a sample of customers.  
Secondary data will be collected at the firm-level from marketing managers to complete 
the data set.  Careful attention will be paid to the sources of the data in an effort to avoid 
common method bias (Podsakoff et al 2003).  The research model presented in chapter 
three will be empirically assessed using well-established methods of analysis.  The 
hypotheses put forth will be addressed based on the outcome of the model testing 
process.  Cognitive evaluation theory serves as the guiding framework for this proposal.  
However, in the event of unexpected results, other established theoretical perspectives 
may be relied upon to provide explanatory value. 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The central thesis of this research involves the unintended consequences to the 
salesperson resulting from the salesperson‘s perceived control, from the customer‘s 
perspective, of channel allowances to gain access to a downstream point of distribution.  
Specifically, a lack of control over these payments is hypothesized to undermine a 
salesperson‘s influence over the customer and the customer loyalty the salesperson 
accrues (i.e., salesperson-owned loyalty).   
These relationships are explored from the perspective of cognitive evaluation 
theory which suggests that extrinsic rewards for a particular activity result in decreased 
intrinsic motivation to engage in the activity.  The theoretical rational is that, when the 
salesperson is perceived to lack control over these payments, downstream channel 
allowances act as an extrinsic source of motivation reducing the customer‘s intrinsic 
motivation to focus attention toward an interpersonal relationship with the salesperson.  
Thus, the salesperson‘s influence over the customer as well the customer‘s loyalty 
toward the salesperson is reduced.  In sum, the key variables of concern include the 
salesperson‘s perceived control of downstream channel allowances, salesperson 
influence, and salesperson-owned loyalty.  The next chapter provides a review of the 
current literature in relation to each of these variables as well as a review of the 
application of cognitive evaluation theory in marketing. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The current dissertation will contribute to multiple research streams with relevancy 
across disciplines.  First, this research will uncover any hidden effects that downstream 
channel payments may be having on key elements of the customer-salesperson 
relationship.  This will more fully inform managers as to the cost and benefits of using 
these payments as part of a distribution strategy.   Second, the conceptualization of 
downstream channel allowances will hopefully lessen confusion that surrounds such 
payments and offer a more concise approach to future research on the topic.  Third, from 
a theoretical perspective, this research will apply cognitive evaluation theory in a new 
context (i.e., customer-salesperson relationships) and may further strengthen the theory 
through empirical testing.   
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Fourth, McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) calls for further research 
using salesperson influence in various firms across different industries to further the 
generalizability of prior research.  The proposed studies address the issue of 
generalizability by employing the salesperson influence construct in relation to channel 
allowances in a business-to-business context.    Fifth, Higgins, Judge, & Ferris (2003) 
suggests that possible moderators exist between influence tactics and work outcomes.  
The current research may serve to further support this idea by showing perceived 
salesperson control of channel allowances acting as a suppression mechanism in the 
relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables in this study (e.g., 
salesperson influence and salesperson performance).  In sum, the value of the current 
research is in the acquisition of knowledge in the area of downstream channel allowances 
in relation to outcome variables important to both the salesperson and the selling-firm. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The central thesis of this research involves the unintended consequences to the 
salesperson resulting from the customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s control over 
channel allowances used to gain access to a downstream point of distribution.  
Specifically, a lack of perceived salesperson control, from the customer‘s point of view, 
over such payments is hypothesized to undermine a salesperson‘s influence over the 
customer and the customer loyalty the salesperson accrues (i.e., salesperson-owned 
loyalty).   
These relationships are explored from the perspective of cognitive evaluation 
theory which suggests that extrinsic rewards for a particular activity result in decreased 
intrinsic motivation to engage in the activity.  The theoretical rational is that downstream 
channel allowances act as an extrinsic source of motivation when a lack of salesperson 
control is perceived by the customer thereby reducing the customer‘s intrinsic motivation 
to focus attention toward an interpersonal relationship with the salesperson.  Thus, the 
salesperson‘s influence over the customer as well the customer‘s loyalty toward the 
salesperson (i.e., salesperson-owned loyalty) is reduced.  In sum, the key variables of 
concern include the customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s control over downstream 
channel allowances, salesperson influence, and salesperson-owned loyalty.  This chapter 
provides a review of the current literature in relation to each of these variables as well as 
a review of the application of cognitive evaluation theory in marketing. 
 
DOWNSTREAM CHANNEL ALLOWANCES 
OVERVIEW 
Marketing scholars often discover meaningful phenomena to study in attempts to acquire 
knowledge regarding marketplace exchanges.  One type of exchange occurs between a 
selling firm and a buying firm.  In a traditional customer-seller exchange a product or 
service flows from the seller to the customer while financial consideration flows from the 
customer back to the seller.  This is perhaps the most common form of exchange studied 
in marketing.  For example, this type of exchange may take place between a business and 
a consumer (business-to-consumer), between two businesses (business-to-business), or 
 
14 
 
between two individuals (peer-to-peer).  In the business-to-business exchange the 
practice of sellers paying customers to buy or, from a different perspective, sellers paying 
customers in order to sell has become more common.  This pay-to-play phenomenon 
goes by many names across multiple industries (See Table 2.1).   
 
 
TABLE 2.1 
Common Terms Used to Describe Downstream Payment Practices
1
 
 
Author(s)      Publication Outlet     Terminology 
 
Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000)  Journal of Marketing      Display Fees 
Failure Fees              
Pay-to-Stay Fees 
Presentation Fees 
Slotting Fees 
Gundlach and Bloom (1998)     Journal of Public Policy & Marketing   Appointment Fees 
Maintenance Fees 
Stocking Allowances 
Jennings, Aalbert, and Happel (2001)    Journal of Law and Commerce     New Product Fees 
Stock Buy-Out Fees 
Kelly (1991)       Journal of Public Policy & Marketing          Advertising Allowances 
 
Marx and Schaffer (2007)     The RAND Journal of Economics    Upfront Payments    
 
1
5
 
   
 
 
TABLE 2.1, CONTINUED 
  
Rennhoff (2004)                   Food Marketing Policy Center        Merchandising Allowances 
Sullivan (1997)      Journal of Law and Economics           Promotional Allowances 
White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000)    Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science     Introductory Allowances      
Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach (2002)    Journal of Public Policy & Marketing        Street Money 
Wolburg (2003)      Journal of Consumer Affairs     Shelf Access Fees   
 
1
These are examples of terms used to describe a payment made to a downstream channel member to gain or maintain distribution of a  
product or service offering.  The list of terms is not exhaustive as other terms are also frequently used to describe this practice. 
 
 
 
1
6
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Although little attention was paid to slotting allowances and related practices 
prior to the mid-1980‘s, the controversial practice of sellers paying customers to gain 
access to a downstream distribution point is widespread in modern business (Laraviere 
and Padmanabhan 1997).    In fact, Desiraju (2001) estimates that $16-Billion are spent 
annually on slotting fees and related payments.  Therefore, this research is relevant to 
multiple industries, government agencies, and academic disciplines.  Specifically, the 
literature reviewed here includes work from the fields of marketing, economics, public 
policy, and ethics.   
In the 20-plus years since Dagnoli and Freeman (1988) made reference to a truce 
in the use of slotting fees this practice has only continued to grow.  Consumer welfare is 
in play; however, the government, at the state and federal level, has been hesitant to 
intervene.  One reason for this lack of response is the absence of sufficient knowledge to 
make decisions and take appropriate action.  Additionally, with little research it is 
difficult to predict the ripple effect that may result from these payments, including any 
unintended consequences which may result within the selling firm or the marketplace.  
Considering how little is known, it is not surprising that there is no agreement as to either 
the benefit or detriment of this practice to competitors, consumers, or other stakeholders 
within the marketplace.  Thus, an unresolved debate exists with opposing views finding 
solace in two distinct schools of thought. 
 
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000) closely examined the different schools of thought 
regarding slotting allowances.  From the perspective of a marketplace exchange, four 
stakeholder groups are affected in some way by slotting fees.  These groups include the 
selling firm making the payment, the buying firm receiving the payment, competitors of 
the selling and buying firms, as well as the consumers buying the product.  In general, 
there are two schools of thought on slotting allowances and related practices.  One is 
known as the efficiency school which holds a positive view of the practice while the other 
is the market power school which holds a more pessimistic view.   
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The Efficiency School 
The efficiency school presents several arguments in favor of these fees and allowances; 
here are three of the most common as suggested by Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 
(2000).  First, in a retail context the fees are beneficial in that they are a highly efficient 
way for retailers to allocate scarce shelf space.  Second, the fees shift some of the risk 
associated with product failure from the customer to the seller.  The rational for this 
benefit is that the new product failure rate is as high as 90% (Israilevich 2004).  This 
necessarily exposes the retailer to a large amount of risk without some compensation 
arrangement in place between the customer and seller in the event of a product failure.  
Thus, these allowances provide a way to accomplish this and distribute the risk more 
efficiently across both parties.   
Third, the fees allow sellers to signal unobservable characteristics of a product to 
customers.  For example, willingness to pay a downstream channel allowance indicates 
that the seller believes in the product and will support it in the future.  Support for this 
signaling theory can be found in the literature (e.g., Sullivan 1989, Kelly 1991, and 
Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997).  The logic is that in the presence of asymmetric 
information favoring the selling-firm, offering a payment for distribution can serve as a 
signal to customers that the seller is confident in the products expected performance.  
Likewise, customers can charge a fee to sellers as a way of screening out products in 
which sellers may be less confident or less willing to support beyond the initial 
distribution. 
 
The Market Power School 
The market power school has several arguments against these fees and 
allowances; here are three of the most common as summarized by Bloom, Gundlach, and 
Cannon (2000).  First, the fees limit a consumer‘s access to competing products thereby 
controlling the individual‘s choice of product.  Along with the forthcoming second 
argument, the choice limitation which is imposed by this practice is a key argument 
against slotting fees put forth by consumer advocates.  Second, the fees increase the price 
of the products consumers buy because manufacturers are forced to increase prices to 
cover the slotting fees that are required by retail customers.  Third, the fees act as an 
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anticompetitive mechanism that puts smaller sellers at a disadvantage in that they are 
unable to compete with the great financial resources of larger sellers.  This final 
argument is the foundational element of the argument heard by the Federal Trade 
Commission (2003) prior to the agency‘s investigation into slotting fees and related 
practices.  However, the conclusion of the FTC report was to refrain from intervening in 
this practice which left the government in the position of siding with the efficiency 
school by default.   
In support of opponents of the market power school, Rao and Mahi (2003) find 
the magnitude (i.e., amount) of the slotting fee charged depends on the power of each 
exchange partner (e.g., more powerful retailers charge higher fees to less powerful 
manufacturers).  In this instance, the use of fees has an overall negative impact on 
competition in the marketplace.  In terms of competition, small sellers are unable to 
compete on the same level as large sellers when it comes to paying the fees charged by 
retailers.  From the consumer‘s perspective, these fees have a real financial cost to sellers 
which must accounted for the wholesale price of the product which will ultimately affect 
the retail price. 
 
 
MARKETING LITERATURE 
Within the marketing literature, there is a minimal amount of work on downstream 
channel allowances (i.e., slotting fees and related practices).  The literature which does 
exist is generally found within the contexts of new product introduction, competition, 
pricing, and consumer welfare.  Each of these research areas are reviewed here while the 
economics literature and another popular domain for this research, public policy, is 
presented subsequently. 
 
New Product Introduction 
The application of downstream channel allowances to the context of new product 
development is a natural fit because these allowances are often used as a mechanism to 
gain initial distribution of a product (e.g., slotting fees).  When used in this way these 
payments between channel members may supplement the efforts of the salesperson (e.g., 
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make it easier for a salesperson to reach a quota), replace portions of the selling function 
(e.g., reduce the number of sales calls necessary to achieve distribution of a new 
product), or undermine relational elements which are important in the customer-
salesperson relationship (e.g., reduce influence and displace loyalty).   
When considering the many fine points involved in specific exchanges between 
customers and sellers, one can see evidence of why there is no clear consensus regarding 
the use of downstream channel allowances.  For example, Laraviere and Padmanabhan 
(1997) find that slotting fees are not necessary in the presence of low retailer costs.  In 
this situation selling firms can signal demand for a new product through wholesale price 
alone because the retailer has little concern over the cost associated with the particular 
transaction.  That is, beyond the price being charged by the selling firm, cost within the 
distribution system is not a significant issue for retailers when putting new products on 
the shelf.  Therefore, manufacturers can adjust the asking price for the product to signal 
unobservable attributes to the customer and avoid the use of downstream payments 
altogether.   
In another example; White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000) find that retailers charge 
introductory allowances and slotting fees in an effort to minimize the perceived risk and 
cost associated with carrying a new product.  In the previous example, Laraviere and 
Padmanabhan (1997) seem to only consider the cost of placing a product in distribution 
with little, if any, consideration for the risk and subsequent cost of product failure.  
White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000) suggest that retailers actually charge these fees in 
association with ―new products‖.  The question remains as to why retailers would charge 
these fees for products which are already in distribution and have proven to be successful 
(e.g., pay-to-stay fees). 
Adopting a different perspective, regarding the use of slotting allowances offered 
by manufacturers, as opposed to fees charged by retailers, Desiraju (2001) finds that 
when these allowances are used by sellers they should be offered on a brand-by-brand 
basis as opposed to being offered as a uniform allowance across all new product 
introductions.  The brand-by-brand method of applying these payments allows the seller 
to address transaction specific elements such as costs and risks related to each new 
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product.  This method is offered as a more efficient way for sellers to apply downstream 
channel allowances in an effort to gain distribution of new products. 
 
 
Competition and Pricing 
As knowledge of downstream channel allowance practices has grown and interest in this 
phenomenon from marketing scholars has increased, more attention is being paid to the 
effects of these payments on competition and pricing.  Specifically, Wolburg (2003) 
provides support for the market power perspective by presenting a case study in which 
less powerful manufacturers are in fact disadvantaged through the use of shelf-access 
fees paid by more powerful manufacturers.  In effect, the larger manufacturer has the 
ability to acquire and exert control over scarce shelf space which is akin to buying real 
estate in that there is a limit to its availability.  Smaller sellers are left to compete for 
what is left over which may only be the the least desirable retail shelf positions (e.g., 
bottom shelf facings).   
In contrast, Sudhir and Rao (2006) argue that slotting allowances and fees are 
efficiency enhancing, in part, because they provide a mechanism to lessen retail 
competition leading to a wider distribution of manufacturer‘s products.  The logic is that 
sellers are able to use payments in a selective way and pick-and-choose distribution 
points in the marketplace essentially reducing competitive effort to a simple financial 
payment.  Further, Kuksov and Pazgal (2007) find that slotting allowances occur more 
frequently and in greater magnitude in the presence of stronger retail competition, a more 
powerful retailer, and higher retailer costs. 
 
Consumer Welfare 
With the growing movement toward transformational consumer research (see Mick 
2006) and the clear benefit to be found by focusing research effort toward the well-being 
of the consumer, some scholars have suggested a relevant tie between downstream 
channel payment practices and consumer welfare.  Specifically, Israilevich (2004) studies 
the impact of ‗side payments‘ made by manufacturers on supermarket product 
assortment.  The author examined slotting allowances and pay-to-stay fees in the 
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supermarket industry.  A key finding from this work is that supermarkets stock some 
products which are not profitable.  However, manufacturers pay slotting allowances for 
these products thus subsidizing them and ensuring their continued distribution regardless 
of the retailer‘s profitability from the sale of the product.  Israilevich (2004) also suggests 
that these products would be discontinued in the absence of slotting allowances therefore 
banning this practice would be detrimental to consumers.  Absent the ability of sellers to 
subsidize the distribution of their less profitable products, consumer choice would be 
negatively affected.  In opposition to this argument, Rennhoff (2004) finds that in the 
absence of merchandising allowances, manufacturers decrease wholesale prices in an 
effort to compete for shelf space which subsequently leads to lower retail prices.  Thus, 
the presence of allowances has a deleterious effect on consumer welfare.  This is yet 
another example of the unresolved nature of the discussion over the use of downstream 
channel allowances and such related payment practices. 
 
 
ECONOMICS 
New Product Introduction 
Complementing the mixed results found in the new product marketing literature, Sullivan 
(1997) studies retail trends of the frequency of new product introductions and retailer 
profits finding support for the market power school of thought.  Specifically, Sullivan 
(1997) suggests that slotting fees allow manufacturers to employ a signaling strategy 
when making new product offerings to customers.   Retailers benefit from slotting fees as 
well in that the fees provide a mechanism for screening and eliminating less desirable 
product offerings which leads to a decrease in the consumer‘s search effort.  Therefore, 
Sulliavn (1997) concludes that slotting allowances are pro-competitive and enhance 
consumer welfare. 
 
Exclusionary Effects 
Marx and Schaffer (2007) suggest when multiple retailers require upfront payments from 
manufacturers; these manufacturers opt to distribute products through the dominant 
retailer at the exclusion of smaller retailers.  This, in effect, means that these payments 
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mitigate competition among retailers because smaller retailers are unable to justify 
charging higher fees based on key drivers such as sales volume.  The larger retailer likely 
to offer the manufacturer an outlet which will lead to higher sales of their products; thus, 
these retailers can justify charging a higher fee for distribution.  In spite of the higher fee 
that must be paid, Marx and Schaffer (2007) find that manufacturers will opt for the 
larger retailer due to the expected benefits.  However, this action leads to higher retail 
prices and decreased product selection across retail competitors, both of which harm 
consumer welfare. 
 
Competition and Pricing  
Shaffer (1991) puts forth a model which shows that in the presence of slotting 
allowances, competition among manufacturers intensifies and retailers realize greater 
profits; while at the same time, consumers pay higher prices.  Therefore, slotting 
allowances are found to be beneficial to retailers but harmful to both manufacturers and 
consumers.  In an earlier effort to explore slotting allowances, Toto (1990) finds that 
slotting allowances have efficiency enhancing effects through improved allocation of 
retail shelf space.  In an effort to go beyond the immediate and obvious effects of slotting 
allowances, Wang (2006) investigates the ripple-effect that slotting allowances have 
within the marketplace.  In particular, Wang (2006) finds that larger retailers charge 
slotting allowances which leads manufacturers to increase wholesale prices to the 
marketplace in an effort to cover these fees.  Thus, smaller retailers are forced to pay 
these higher wholesale prices but lack the market power to levee slotting fees against the 
manufacturer.  The anticompetitive result is smaller retailers, in comparison to larger 
retailers, experience lower profit margins and market share. 
 
 
PUBLIC POLICY  
Antitrust Issues 
In an effort to understand the public policy implications of slotting fees and related 
practices, Cannon and Bloom (1991) conclude that the practice of charging slotting fees 
is increasing.  However, the authors establish no basis for any harmful effects of these 
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fees to either competition or consumers.  As a possible explanation for the increase in the 
occurrence of slotting fees, Kelly (1991) suggests that a rise in product innovation 
increased the demand for retail shelf space resulting in the use of these fees as a way to 
allocate shelf space.  Further, Kelly (1991) suggests that in the absence of support for any 
harmful effects of slotting fees, signaling and risk-shifting may be reasonable 
justifications for using these fees.  In a more recent effort; Bone, Francis, and Riley 
(2006) find that slotting fees are now used across multiple industries although the 
application of these payments varies based on industry norms.  Additionally, the authors 
find no support for the efficiency enhancing effects of slotting fees.  However, support is 
found in favor of the market power perspective which takes a negative perspective on 
such fees and allowances.  In particular, large manufacturers were more likely to pay 
slotting fees while larger retailers were more likely to demand these fees. 
 
Product Discrimination 
In a review of the legal issues related to the increasing use of slotting fees in the late-
1980‘s and early-1990‘s, Aalberts and Judd (1991) suggest that regulatory action may be 
forthcoming due to the discriminatory nature of this practice.  However, the Bureau of 
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) did subsequently ban the practice; while the 
Federal Trade Commission, which is the governing body for products outside of the 
domain of the BATF, reviewed the use of slotting fees and related practices and took no 
action (see FTC 2003).  The contradictory position held by the BATF and the FTC was 
explored by Gundlach and Bloom (1998).  A possible rational was offered to justify the 
opposite views of the FTC and the BATF.  Specifically, the authors suggest that the 
BATF ruling which banned the use of downstream payments in the distribution and sale 
of alcohol is grounded in case law which came about shortly after prohibition.  The FTC 
is unable to justify the same regulatory behavior because there is no such case law on 
which to draw from and the post-prohibition law cited by the BATF does not apply to 
non-alcohol related products. 
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General Policy Issues 
Offering support for the notion that slotting fee occurrences are becoming more 
widespread, Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach (2002) find that the practice continued to 
grow throughout the 1990‘s.  Further, the authors find that this practice has moved 
beyond the grocery industry and into other areas of the marketplace such as airports, 
internet commerce, and textiles.  With no resolution to the opposing schools of thought, 
and now a more widespread application of these payments, the debate over this practice 
has intensified.  In a review of court rulings and case law, Balto (2002) suggests that 
interest in slotting allowances and related practices will continue to grow among scholars 
as well as public policy makers. 
 With careful attention to the ethical considerations surrounding slotting 
allowances and related practices, Aalberts and Jennings (1999) suggest that the current 
application of slotting fees is unethical on the grounds that ―market access is controlled 
by something other than quality or demand‖ (p. 214).  In addition, the authors suggest 
that this practice violates Fieser‘s (1996) fairness principle; that is, businesses are denied 
the chance to compete in the marketplace without retailers reviewing the product.  The 
application of downstream channel allowances by sellers, as well as the charging of these 
fees by customers, offers a rich area of inquiry for scholars with an interest in business 
ethics.  The current review of academic research uncovered a significant deficiency in the 
literature regarding the study of ethics in relation to slotting fees and other types of 
downstream payments made in the marketplace.  Scholars have a great deal of work 
remaining in this area.  Refer to table 2.2 below for a summary of the key findings from 
academic research across multiple contexts and disciplines. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.2 
Key Studies of Downstream Channel Allowance Practices 
 
Author(s)     Context & Rational  Finding(s) 
MARKETING LITERATURE 
Laraviere and Padmanabhan (1997) New Product   Slotting fees are not needed in the presence of low        
Signaling Theory retailer cost as manufacturers can signal demand of new 
products through wholesale price alone. 
 
Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000)  Schools of Thought  Mixed results: Retailers view slotting allowances as  
Efficiency Theory                   efficiency enhancing and manufacturers view the 
Market Power Theory practice as an abuse of market power. 
 
White, Troy, and Gerlich (2000) New Product   Retailers use introductory allowances and slotting   Risk-
Shifting   fees to minimize perceived risk and cost associated  
                                                                       Cost-Sharing                           with carrying a new product. 
 
Desiraju (2001)    New Product   Regardless of information asymmetry,      
                                                                       Asymmetric Information         manufacturer allowances should be offered on a 
 brand-by-brand basis as opposed to offering a uniform 
allowance. 
 
Rao and Mahi (2003)    New Product   In support of the market power school, the  
Signaling Theory                    magnitude of the slotting fee charged depends on   
                                                                        Market Power                         the power of each exchange partner (e.g., more  
powerful retailers charge higher fees to less powerful 
manufacturers). 
2
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Wolburg (2003)    Competition   Case study which indicates that less powerful  
Antitrust    manufacturers are disadvantaged through the use of Market 
Power                 shelf-access fees paid by more powerful manufacturers. 
 
Israilevich (2004)     Product Assortment  Instead of discontinuing non-profitable products,  
Consumer Welfare    retailers charge fees to subsidize the cost of  
continuing to carry the products. Thus, eliminating such 
fees would diminish product assortment and have a 
detrimental effect on consumer welfare. 
 
Rennhoff (2004)     Pricing    In the absence of merchandising allowances,  
Competition    manufacturers decrease wholesale prices to 
Consumer Welfare   compete for shelf space which leads to lower retail  
prices. Thus, the presence of  allowances has a deleterious 
effect on consumer welfare. 
 
Gundlach (2005)    Competition   A review of the Federal Trade Commission‘s  
Exclusionary Effects   framework on  the use of slotting fees and related  
practices indicates that these fees can exhibit both pro-
competitive and anti-competitive effects depending on the 
circumstances. 
 
Sudhir and Rao (2006)   New Product    Slotting allowances are efficiency enhancing (e.g.,  
Competition   retail space allocation), shift risk of new product Signaling 
Efficiency Enhancing  failure from retailer to manufacturer, reduce information  
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asymmetry through signaling by manufacturers, and lessen 
retail competition leading to wider distribution of 
manufacturer‘s products. 
 
Kuksov and Pazgal (2007)   Competition   Slotting allowances occur more frequently and in  
Market Power   greater magnitude in the presence of greater retail  
competition, a more powerful retailer, and higher retailer 
costs.  
ECONOMICS LITERATURE 
Toto (1990)     Competition   Slotting allowances have efficiency enhancing  
Efficiency Enhancing  effects through improved allocation of retail shelf  
space. 
 
Shaffer (1991)     Pricing    In the presence of slotting allowances, competition  
Competition   among  manufacturers intensifies and retailers  
Consumer Welfare   realize greater profits while consumers pay higher  
prices.  Therefore, slotting allowances are harmful to 
manufacturers and consumers. 
 
Sullivan (1997)     New Products   Slotting allowances allow manufacturers to employ  
Signaling    signaling and retailers to screen products which minimizes  
Screening    consumer‘s search effort. Thus, slotting allowances are 
Consumer Welfare  pro-competitive and enhance consumer welfare. 
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Wang (2006)     Competition    Larger retailers charge slotting allowances which  
Market Power   leads to an increase in manufacturer‘s wholesale  
price to the marketplace. Smaller retailers are forced to pay 
higher wholesale prices but lack the power to levee slotting 
allowances. The result is smaller retailers experience lower 
profit margins and market share than larger retailers. 
 
 
Marx and Schaffer (2007)   Competition   When multiple retailers require upfront payments  
Exclusionary Effects   from manufacturers, these manufacturers opt to  
Consumer Welfare   distribute products through the dominant retailer at  
the exclusion of smaller retailers. This leads to  
higher prices and decreased product selection, both of 
which harm consumers. 
 
PUBLIC POLICY  
Aalberts and Judd (1991)   Legal Review   Reviews legal issues related the increasing use of  
Price Discrimination   slotting fees in the late-1980‘s and early-1990‘s.  
The authors suggest that regulatory action may be 
forthcoming due to the discriminatory nature of these fees. 
 
Cannon and Bloom (1991)   New Product   Although the authors conclude that the practice of  
Antitrust Issues   charging slotting fees is increasing as of the late- 
      1980‘s, they establish no basis for any harmful effects of  
2
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these fees to either competition or consumers. They call for 
further research by marketing scholars on this phenomenon. 
  
Kelly (1991)      Antitrust Issues  The author suggests that a rise in product    
     Signaling   innovation has increased demand for retail shelf  
Risk-Shifting    space resulting in the materialization of slotting  
fees as a mechanism for shelf space allocation.  The  
author also suggests that in the absence of support  
for any harmful effects of slotting fees, signaling and risk-
shifting may be reasonable explanations  
for the use of these fees. 
 
Gundlach and Bloom (1998)   Retail Alcohol Sales  The authors explore the different legal precedence  
      Policy Differences  which  lead the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and  
Firearms to ban the use of slotting fees in the retail sale of 
alcohol while the Federal Trade Commission has not taken 
action in other segments of the retail marketplace. Note: It 
is prohibited by the BATF for suppliers of alcoholic 
beverages to pay slotting fees to retailers even though 
suppliers of other products competing for the same retail 
space are permitted  
to offer these payments. 
 
Balto (2002)     Legal Review   In relation to slotting allowances, the author  
provides a review of recent court rulings, case law,  
and the Federal Trade Commission report in this  
3
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practice. The concludes that the interest in slotting  
allowances from academia as well as public policy  
makers will continue to grow. 
 
 
Wilkie, Desrochers, and Gundlach (2002) Public Policy   The authors find that the practice continued its  
Channel Member Views  rapid growth in the 1980‘s all through the decade of  
the 1990‘s. The practice of slotting fees not only  
continues to grow in the retail grocery industry but  
is now spreading to other industries (e.g., airports,  
internet commerce, textiles, etc).  Analysis of  
survey data gathered from manufacturers  
wholesalers, and retailers indicate that the issue of  
slotting fees remains controversial. 
 
 
 
Bone, France, and Riley (2006)  Public Policy   Slotting fees are used across multiple industries  
Efficiency Theory   although the application of this practice varies  
Market Power Theory  based on industry norms. No support is found for the 
efficiency enhancing effects of slotting fees however 
support was found in favor of the market power hypothesis 
as larger manufacturers were more likely to pay slotting 
fees and larger retailers  
were more likely to demand these fees. 
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ETHICS 
Aalberts and Jennings (1999)   Competition,   The authors suggest that the current application of  
Exclusionary Effects   slotting fees is unethical on the grounds that  
―market access is controlled by something other than 
quality or demand‖ (p. 214). In addition, this practice 
violates Fieser‘s (1996) fairness principle (i.e., businesses 
are denied the chance to compete in the marketplace 
without retailers reviewing the product). 
 
 
3
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SALESPERSON INFLUENCE 
One of the responsibilities of a salesperson is to ensure that a customer makes a decision 
which is both appropriate for the buying organization while at the same time furthering 
the objectives of the selling organization.  Multiple strategies and techniques exist that 
are intended to assist the successful salesperson in accomplishing this goal in an 
efficacious manner (e.g., adaptive selling, consultative selling, and relationship building).  
Without doubt, much progress has been made in the acquisition of knowledge related to 
the field of personal selling in the forty years since Frederick Webster (1968) commented 
that ―one of the most frequently asked and incompletely answered questions in 
marketing‖ pertains to understanding what makes a ―successful‖ salesperson.  The 
current research takes an opposing view by asking what makes an unsuccessful 
salesperson.  Specifically, may a sales manager or selling-firm engage in activities which 
appear to be beneficial but are unknowingly undermine the effectiveness of the 
salesperson? 
Scholars have dedicated many years of thoughtful effort to the pursuit of 
answering the questions most relevant to personal selling.  One example of such work is 
the inquiry into the role that influence tactics play in the salesperson-customer interaction 
(Spiro & Perreault 1979; Frazier & Summers 1984; Kholi & Zaltman 1988; Crosby, 
Evans, & Cowles 1990; Brown 1990; McFarland 2003; Borders 2006; McFarland, 
Challagalla, & Shervani 2006).  Spiro and Perreault (1979) suggest that ―the concept of 
influence implies an effort to move the attitudes or behavior of a target person (the 
customer) in a pre-specified direction‖ (p. 453).  This would seem to be the main task 
salespeople face in convincing prospects that a certain product or service is best suited, 
above all others, for the needs of the buying firm.  Refer to table 2-3 below for a 
summary of influence methods used by salespeople in an attempt to gain compliance 
from a customer. 
 
 
TABLE 2.3 
Prior Research Constructs of Salesperson Influence Methods 
 
Influence Strategy    Description 
 
Expert
1
     The salesperson discusses specific information about the offering and how it may  
be useful to the customer‘s firm. 
 
Impression Management
1
   The salesperson attempts to maintain control over the views and opinions of the  
salesperson held by the customer. 
 
Information Exchange 
2
   The salesperson discusses general issues and procedures to try to alter the  
customer‘s general perceptions without stating a request. 
 
Ingratiation
1,3
     The salesperson engages in behaviors aimed at improving the salesperson‘s  
interpersonal attractiveness and improving rapport with the customer to gain compliance. 
 
Inspiration Appeals
3
    The salesperson makes statements intended to appeal to the customer‘s values  
and ideals thereby motivating the customer to make decisions which may not be in the 
customer‘s personal interest. 
 
Legitimate
1
     The salesperson attempts to gain compliance by leveraging the positive opinions  
held by the customer (e.g., reputation, experience) toward the selling firm. 
 
Promises
2
     The salesperson promises the customer a reward if the customer complies with a  
request. 
 
3
4
 
   
 
 
TABLE 2.3, CONTINUED 
 
Recommendations
2
    The salesperson predicts that the customer will be more profitable if the customer  
follows the salesperson‘s suggestions. 
 
Referent
1
     The salesperson attempts to gain compliance by using the personal relationship  
that the salesperson has with the customer. 
 
Threats
2
     The source threatens the target with a future penalty if the target does not comply  
with a request. 
 
 
 
Source:  
1
Spiro and Perreault (1979) 
    2
Payan and McFarland (2005)  
    
3
McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) 
3
5
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Drawing partly on the work of French and Raven, and in combination with 
interviews conducted with salespeople across multiple industries, Spiro & Perreault 
(1979) focus research around five influence methods used by salespeople; expert, 
impression management, ingratiation, legitimate, and referent influence methods.  
Consistent with other scholars, the authors explicate these methods based on open- 
versus close-personal strategies (Brown 1990; Falbo 1977; Spiro and Perreault 1979; and 
Weitz 1981).  An open strategy is one in which the salesperson‘s objectives are apparent 
to the customer and there is no hidden agenda.  A closed-strategy is just the opposite; the 
objectives of the salesperson remain unknown to the customer.   
Of the five influence methods offered by Spiro and Perreault (1979); expert, 
legitimate, and referent influence methods are considered open-strategies while 
ingratiation and impression management are closed-strategies.  Although prior research 
has considered open influence strategies in selling, Spiro and Perreault (1979) took the 
initial look at the two closed-strategies mentioned.  Salespeople are advised to use 
caution when using any influence tactic because even methods used by salespeople with 
no hidden objectives, but which is perceived by the customer as such, may likely lead to 
undesirable outcomes for the selling firm (Spiro and Perreault 1979 and Brown 1990). 
In addition, Spiro and Perreault (1979) advanced the understanding of influence 
in selling by considering the ways in which salespeople use multiple strategies based on 
the sales situation (i.e., influence-strategy mixes).  In this work, influence strategies and 
the way they are combined by salespeople were examined based a set of situational 
factors including both salesperson and customer characteristics, the interaction between 
the salesperson and customer, and select marketplace factors.  As a result, Spiro and 
Perreault (1979) find that salesperson influence attempts increase in the presence of 
higher customer-involvement in the sales call.  Further, they find that the more important 
a salesperson perceives the sale to be, the more likely s/he will employ influence 
methods.  Of note, Spiro and Perreault (1979) find that when a salesperson is faced with 
a difficult situation (e.g., a difficult customer or a challenging negotiation), closed 
influence strategies (i.e., ingratiation and impression management) are more likely to be 
used.  The authors point out that this exposes the selling-firm to certain risks in the event 
that the customer discovers the presence of hidden objectives in the salesperson‘s 
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influence attempts.  Customers may find this to be manipulative and thus form a negative 
opinion of the salesperson and the selling-firm. 
In a later effort, Frazier & Summers (1984) investigate interfirm influence 
methods based on a taxonomy of six influence strategies; information exchange, 
legalistic pleas, promises, recommendations, requests, and threats.  They find that the 
information exchange method is used most frequently by salespeople.  This strategy was 
used more than requests which were used second most and more than recommendations 
by a two-to-one margin.  One explanation offered by the authors is that in the presence of 
frequent information exchange it becomes decreasingly necessary for a salesperson to 
make recommendations.  Although over time an information exchange strategy can 
require greater expenditure of selling resources (e.g., time), by providing information 
which will shape the prospect‘s opinion in favor of the selling-firm‘s offering, a 
recommendation is often not needed (Frazier and Summers 1984).  In terms of 
frequency, the influence methods of promises, threats, and legalistic pleas ranked in this 
order.  Additionally, a positive correlation was found between information exchange and 
request which the authors suggest is an indication that these two strategies are 
complimentary in nature.   
Noteworthy and of special interest to channel‘s researchers, a negative correlation 
was found between the desirable variable of interfirm agreement and the frequency of 
requests (Frazier and Summers 1984).  Frazier and Summers (1984) point out that this is 
contradictory to findings regarding the use of promises in social psychology.  Upon 
closer review of the analysis of the data in this study, the logic for such a finding 
becomes more apparent.  Promises and threats were highly correlated with each other 
which is an indication that both strategies share something in common.  That is, both 
strategies involve either the giving, or the holding back from giving, of something that 
the prospect desires (Frazier and Summers 1984).  In sum, Frazier and Summers (1984) 
suggest that salespeople are best advised to focus primarily on using information 
exchange in conjunction with requests, use recommendations sparingly and only when 
necessary, and avoid using promises, threats, or legalistic pleas. 
Along these same lines; Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman (1995) provide a study of 
influence strategies in an inter-organizational context.  The authors use a similar set of 
influence strategies from prior research (i.e., information exchange, legalistic pleas, 
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promises, recommendations, requests, and threats) and categorize each strategy based on 
coercive intensity, task orientation, and instrumentality.  In support of Frazier and 
Summers (1984), Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman (1995) find that information exchange, 
requests and recommendations are the most frequently used while promises, threats and 
legalistic pleas are used far less often.   
In yet another example of how one may delineate and categorize influence 
strategies, McFarland (2003) provides a dichotomy of influence methods based on the 
concepts of persuasion and coercion (see also Barron and Staten 1995).  Persuasive 
influence methods aim to alter the customer‘s attitude toward the offering leading to the 
realization that the salesperson‘s product is in fact the best choice available.  Such 
influence methods include information exchange, requests, and recommendations (Payan 
and McFarland 2005).  Coercive influence methods aim to gain compliance through 
reward or punishment and include such influence strategies as promises, threats, and 
legalistic pleas.  McFarland (2003) finds that when a salesperson engages in coercive 
influence strategies s/he subsequently experiences an increased level of both physical and 
mental stress.  So, why do salespeople continue use these methods of influence (e.g., 
Barron and Staten 1995)?  There may be a power imbalance between the buying and 
selling firm which favors the seller or the salesperson may be under intense pressure to 
perform which leads the salesperson to identify coercive influence tactics as the optimal 
strategy (McFarland 2003). 
In support of prior research, Payan and McFarland (2005) investigate the use of 
influence strategies in gaining compliance form channel members.  Similar to other 
scholars, the authors use the tactics of information exchange, promises, 
recommendations, requests, and threats.  However, the influence method of rationality is 
added and subsequently found to be the most effective in gaining channel member 
compliance.  The authors describe the rationality strategy as ―…(when a salesperson) 
presents reasons accompanied with supportive information for a target to comply with a 
request‖ (Payan and McFarland 2005, p.68).  Further, Payan and McFarland (2005) find 
that non-coercive influence strategies are more effective at gaining channel member 
compliance than the coercive tactics such as promises and threats. 
While adopting a different perspective of the customer-salesperson dyad and 
drawing on the work of other scholars such as Dwyer, Frazier, McFarland, and Cialdini; 
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Borders (2006) puts forth a conceptual framework of influence methods referred to as 
―Customer Initiated Influence Tactics‖ or CIIT.  This taxonomy consists of ingratiation, 
requests, promises, and threats.  Although offering nothing new to the list of influence 
methods discussed elsewhere in this review, the idea that these influence methods can be 
used by the customer as a compliance gaining attempt over the salesperson does provide 
a rare insight and an intriguing direction for further inquiry.  Certainly, there is much to 
be gained by studying the strategies and behaviors that firm-level customers use in 
dealing with industrial salespeople. 
Previous research has also explored the relationship between the influence tactics 
used by salespeople and the customer orientations of prospects which results in two key 
findings (McFarland, Challagalla, & Shervani 2006).  First, although customers are quite 
complex, salespeople can use a particular influence tactic which, based on the orientation 
of the customer, will lead to a more effective means of persuasion.  Second, salespeople 
studied in the work by McFarland et al (2006) were able to identify which influence 
tactics were most appropriate based on the customer‘s orientation.  Taken together, these 
findings indicate that disparate customers can be persuaded and salespeople can be 
trained to select the appropriate influence tactic(s) to persuade these customers.  In 
related research on customer orientation, Williams and Spiro (1985) find that assessing 
customer orientation based on the three categories of task-, self-, and interaction-
orientation is ―significant‖ in terms of the amount of variance explained in a sales 
exchange.  McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) built upon this previous work in 
showing that customer orientation is a worthwhile consideration in making a choice of 
influence tactic.   
Customers with a task orientation ―focus on the task at hand‖, prefer that sales 
interactions be ―as efficient as possible‖, and are ―highly goal oriented‖ (McFarland, 
Challagalla, and Shervani 2006; p. 115).  While information exchange is an influence 
tactic that can be used effectively across all three customer orientations, a task oriented 
customer will also respond most positively to the influence tactic of making 
recommendations (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006). 
A customer with a self orientation cares more about ―what [he/she has] to say‖ as 
opposed to what the seller might say and attempts to ―impress‖ the salesperson with 
his/her own knowledge and experience (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006; p. 
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115).  The authors find that ingratiation is an effective choice of influence tactic to use 
when dealing with a self-oriented customer.  In addition to ingratiation, the use of 
promises is a suggested method of influence to use with such a customer (McFarland, 
Challagalla, and Shervani 2006). 
Customers with an interaction orientation view salesperson encounters as an 
opportunity to socialize with the seller. This type of customer appears to be interested in 
getting to know the salesperson beyond what might be expected in a typical business 
relationship (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006).  The influence methods of 
ingratiation and the use of inspirational appeals are the two recommended tactics when 
dealing with an interaction oriented customer (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 
2006).   
However, many questions remain unanswered in this regard.  The literature is 
lacking in a thorough exploration of the potential mechanisms that may undermine the 
salesperson‘s ability to influence customers.  For instance, when two salespeople use the 
influence tactic of ingratiation, from the perspective of the customer, the salesperson may 
be viewed as a provider of information, a close ally in business, or a consultant in the 
process of making important decisions. In contrast, a salesperson may also be viewed as 
a consumer of time, a spy for the competition, and someone to be avoided until needed. 
Ironically, when considering two salespeople working for the same firm and selling the 
identical product line, one could be viewed by the customer in terms of positive 
characteristics, while the other in terms of negative ones. The difference between these 
salespeople may simply be each one‘s ability to choose the appropriate influence tactic 
and to use it correctly.  This review uncovers a need for further research in understanding 
why salespeople experience different levels of success when using the same influence 
method. 
 Also as guidance for future research; McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 
(2006) provide a taxonomy of influence tactics that are most often used by salespeople. 
This set of six influence methods is drawn from previous research covered in this review 
and includes information exchange, recommendations, threats, promises, ingratiation, 
and inspirational appeals. These methods combine to form what is referred to as 
―salesperson influence tactics‖ (SITs).   
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SALESPERSON INFLUENCE TAXONOMY 
 
Information Exchange 
A salesperson engages in the tactic of information exchange without the expectation of a 
commitment from the customer and without providing any recommendations regarding a 
course of action that a customer might take (McFarland, Challagalla, & Shervani 2006). 
During this process of information exchange, the salesperson provides relevant 
information to the customer and may also ask questions of the customer; however, the 
salesperson avoids making specific attempts at influencing the customer toward having a 
positive view of the product being offered (McFarland,Challagalla, & Shervani 2006). 
 
Recommendations 
Recommendations are made when the salesperson leads a customer to believe that 
―following a specific course of action‖ is in the best interests of the customer and the 
buying organization (Venkatesh, Kohli, & Zaltman 1995). Add a page number for the 
quote.  Generally, a salesperson may make recommendations that are solely in the best 
interests of the buying-firm or solely in the interests of the selling-firm. However, an 
enlightened salesperson may find it best to offer suggestions that strike a balance 
between the interests of both the buying- and selling-firm. 
 
Threats 
As one might imagine, the decision to use threats as a method of influence must be 
chosen only after much consideration by a salesperson. Once a threat has been made, one 
may not rescind its effects so easily.  Boyle and Dwyer (1995) consider a threat to be an 
act of coercion in that a salesperson suggests that a penalty will result at some point in 
the future in the event that the customer does not agree to follow the salesperson‘s 
request. While this influence method is included in the SIT taxonomy, it is nevertheless 
used sparingly. 
 
Promises 
While a threat may suggest that a negative action is forthcoming if a salesperson‘s 
request is not granted, a promise is an indication that a positive occurrence should be 
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expected when a salesperson‘s request is met (Venkatesh, Kohli, & Zaltman 1995). It is 
conceivable that a synergistic effect may result from the use of both promises and threats 
in relation to the same requests. However, it is just as possible that any goodwill 
achieved by making a promise will be erased in light of the negativity surrounding a 
threat. 
 
Ingratiation 
 
Ingratiation has been defined as ―an attempt by individuals to increase their attractiveness 
in the eyes of others so as to influence those others‘ behavior‖ (Cooper 2005 add the 
page number). The importance of ingratiation as a path to persuasion must not be 
underestimated. Frenzen and Davis (1990) find that a strong social bond between the 
customer and seller is more likely to lead to a product purchase decision than is the 
customer‘s preference for the actual product. One might take this empirical finding as an 
example of support for the idea that all things being equal, people tend to buy from those 
whom they like. Ingratiation is a pathway to liking that ultimately may lead to 
commitment. 
 
Inspirational Appeal 
 
An inspirational appeal is often used as a way to encourage a customer to make a 
decision that may not be based on the best interests of one specific party (Yukl & Tracey 
1992). For example, a seller may suggest that a customer should make a decision that, 
although may not be the optimal choice for the buying organization, is in the best 
interests of the environment and the surrounding community. To accomplish such an 
outcome, a seller must ―appeal to [the customer‘s] values, ideals, or aspirations‖ (Yukl & 
Tracey 1992).  See table 2-4 for a summary of the SITs taxonomy to be used in the 
current research. 
 
 
TABLE 2.4 
Salesperson Influence Tactics Taxonomy and Definitions 
 
Influence Strategy    Definition 
 
Information Exchange 
1
   The source discusses general issues and procedures to try to alter the target‘s  
general perceptions without stating a request. 
 
Recommendations
1
    The source predicts that the target will be more profitable if the target follows the  
source‘s suggestions. 
 
Threats
1
     The source threatens the target with a future penalty if the target does not comply  
with a request. 
 
Promises
1
     The source promises the target a reward if the target complies with a request. 
 
 
Ingratiation
2
     The source engages in behaviors aimed at improving the sources interpersonal  
attractiveness and improving rapport with the target. 
 
Inspiration Appeals
2
    The source makes statements intended to appeal to the target‘s values and ideals  
thereby motivating the target to make decisions which may not be in the target‘s personal 
interest. 
 
Source:  
1
Payan and McFarland (2005)  
    
2
Mcfarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) 
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SALESPERSON-OWNED LOYALTY AND FIRM-OWNED LOYALTY 
 
In a customer-seller relationship, a customer may be expected to hold a certain level of 
loyalty to the selling firm regardless of whether this level is high, low, or somewhere in 
between.  Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) hypothesize that some of this 
customer loyalty may be directed toward the firm (i.e., firm-owned loyalty) while a 
portion of it may be directed toward a particular salesperson (i.e., salesperson-owned 
loyalty).  Both the object and degree of loyalty is of importance to the salesperson as well 
as the selling firm.   
For example, in the event that a salesperson chooses to leave an organization, 
then the value of this individual salesperson‘s performance is lost. However, in terms of 
customer loyalty, the value lost will ultimately depend on which of these two targets (i.e., 
the salesperson or the selling firm) the customer is loyal to and the degree of loyalty that 
the customer holds toward each. At one extreme, if the customer is loyal to the selling 
firm exclusively, then no real value is lost in terms of customer loyalty if the salesperson 
chooses to leave. However, if salesperson-owned loyalty is high the firm stands to lose a 
great deal more, particularly if the salesperson exits in favor of a competitor (Palmatier, 
Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007). 
This presents an intriguing dilemma for the selling organization. How desirable is 
it to maximize or minimize salesperson-owned loyalty? The firm may be best served by 
focusing first on the customer‘s commitment toward the firm, second toward the product, 
and finally toward the salesperson. However, this is a challenging task in that customers 
may tend to relate best to an individual (i.e., a salesperson), while it is difficult to 
personify a product or an entity (i.e., the firm). Thus, an argument could be made that 
developing firm-owned loyalty may be an important indicator of a salesperson‘s level of 
performance. In any case, both salesperson-owned loyalty and firm-owned loyalty are 
relatively new constructs in the marketing literature which are considered in this 
dissertation. 
Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) find that firm-owned loyalty positively 
affects a customer‘s willingness to pay a price premium for the selling firm‘s offering.  
Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) find that salesperson-owned loyalty positively 
affects a customer‘s willingness to pay a price premium, sales growth to the customer, 
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selling effectiveness (e.g., sales to this customer outperformed the selling firm‘s overall 
sales performance).  The authors caution that any risk associated with the acquisition of 
salesperson-owned loyalty must be considered in relation to the expected benefit to the 
firm of this form of loyalty from a customer. 
 
COGNITIVE EVALUATION THEORY 
OVERVIEW 
Cognitive evaluation theory (CET) is a theory of motivation which puts forth the idea 
that there are two sources of motivation; intrinsic and extrinsic (Deci, Koestner, and 
Ryan 1999).  Intrinsic motivation flows from the enjoyment or interest of an activity.  A 
person who is intrinsically motivated engages in the activity because of the satisfaction it 
gives them.  Extrinsic motivation flows from some source outside of the activity.  
Although there is some debate regarding the impact of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic 
motivation, there is a strong argument that extrinsic rewards undermine the positive 
effects of intrinsic motivation (e.g., Bernstein 1990).  Specifically, when one receives an 
incentive (e.g., cash) to engage in an activity, the level of intrinsic motivation to perform 
the task diminishes.  In relation to the current study, as customers and buying firms are 
paid via downstream channel allowances to provide access for the selling firm‘s offering, 
does the customer‘s intrinsic motivation to build and maintain loyalty to the salesperson 
and/or selling firm diminish?  Further, what impact may a decrease in intrinsic 
motivation on the part of the customer affect the salesperson‘s ability to exert influence 
over the customer? 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH APPLICATIONS 
The application of cognitive evaluation theory in marketing is not new (see 
Anderson and Oliver 1987; Challagalla and Shervani 1996; Christen, Iyer, and Soberman 
2006; Dahl and Moreau 2007; Kivetz 2003; Kohli, Shervani, and Challagalla 1998; and 
Van Trijp, Hoyer, and Inman 1996).  In a conceptual piece on salesforce control systems, 
Anderson and Oliver (1987) use cognitive evaluation theory as one of four separate 
theoretical perspectives in understanding behavior-based versus outcome-based control 
systems.  Additional perspectives considered in this research include agency theory, 
organization theory, and transaction cost analysis.  Anderson and Oliver (1987) suggest 
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that in large part these theories predict that a behavior-based control system is preferable 
in the presence of environmental uncertainty. Specific to cognitive evaluation theory, the 
authors suggest that, even though no one system is ideal across all occasions, a behavior-
based control system is most suited for maximal intrinsic motivation. 
Using the perspective of cognitive evaluation theory in conjunction with other 
theories of motivation, Challagalla and Shervani (1996) advance the work of Anderson 
and Oliver (1987) by further delineating behavior-based control into the categories of 
activity and capability control.  While capability control focuses on the development of a 
person‘s skills and abilities, activity control focuses on providing a person with specific 
behaviors which s/he is expected to perform, as well as overseeing and guiding such 
behavior through the use of rewards and punishments (Challagalla and Shervani 1996).  
A key finding from this research is that sales managers are most likely to see an increase 
in a salesperson‘s level of intrinsic motivation when using a capability control approach 
versus activity control.  Challagalla and Shervani (1996) provide the rational for this 
finding in that prior research (see Deci and Ryan 1985) suggests ―…information that is 
aimed at improving competencies is likely to increase intrinsic motivation‖ (p. 99). 
In an investigation of consumer choice behavior; Van Trijp, Hoyer, and Inman 
(1996) use the elements of cognitive evaluation theory to further distinguish variety 
seeking behaviors.  Specifically, the authors find that variety seeking behavior among 
consumers is not uniform across all marketplace situations (e.g., product characteristics).  
That is, intrinsic motivation leads to ―true‖ variety seeking behavior while extrinsic 
motivation leads to ―derived‖ variety seeking behavior.  In applying these findings to 
marketing strategy; Van Trijp, Hoyer, and Inman (1996) suggests that when an offering 
is similar to competing offerings, requires low involvement, and is purchased with high 
frequency; a strategy aimed at the consumers intrinsic motivation will be most effective 
at encouraging brand switching (e.g., a call to action for the sake of variety).  On the 
other hand, when these characteristics are not present in the offering then a more 
effective strategy would be extrinsic motivation (e.g., a sale).  
In a study mapping the effects of supervisor orientation onto the learning 
orientation of salespeople Kohli, Shervani, and Challagalla (1998) employ cognitive 
evaluation theory in connecting the capability oriented manager to the salesperson‘s 
learning orientation.  Specifically, the authors suggest that a capability oriented manager 
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plays the role of ―coach‖ to the salesforce thus leading to individual salespeople with 
higher levels of intrinsic motivation.  Further empirical analysis offers support for this 
rational in that a supervisor‘s capability orientation was found to be positively related to 
the salesperson‘s learning orientation (Kohli, Shervani, and Challagalla 1998). 
Kivetz (2003) applies cognitive evaluation theory to the study of the effort that 
one is willing to put forth in relation to the uncertainty of a reward and the significance 
of the reward.  Not surprisingly, the authors found that the more a person finds the 
activity to be enjoyable (i.e., intrinsically motivating) the more likely s/he is to forgo a 
sure but less significant reward in exchange for a larger but uncertain reward which has 
to be earned through the effort put forth. Similarly, on the grounds of cognitive 
evaluation theory (i.e., intrinsic motivation); Christen, Iyer, and Soberman (2006) 
suggest that an individual‘s actual job performance has an effect on his/her overall job 
satisfaction.  In support of this, the authors find, by distinguishing a manager‘s effort 
from his/her performance, that a positive job performance leads to higher intrinsic 
motivation (i.e., enjoyment of effort) which results in greater job satisfaction. 
In an application of cognitive evaluation theory to consumer behavior, Dahl and 
Moreau (2007) study the effects of competence and autonomy on ―consumer‘s creative 
experiences‖.  The authors find that an individual with greater skill to perform a given 
task (i.e., competence) and the freedom to complete the task in a self-determining manner 
(i.e., autonomy) will find the task to be more enjoyable (i.e., intrinsically motivating).  In 
relation to the current research, the decline in intrinsic motivation may flow from a threat 
to the customer‘s autonomy caused by the use of downstream payments.  The customer 
may feel that s/he is now engaging in a relationship with the salesperson because s/he 
―has‖ to as opposed to ―wanting‖ to invest the time. 
 
RESEARCH GAP 
To date, scholars have examined slotting fees and related practices across 
contexts. This work includes the ongoing debate over the channel effects of such fees 
(e.g., Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000; Marx and Schaffer 2007), the relevance of 
these fees to new product development (e.g., Desai 2000; Desiraju 2001; Rao and Mahi 
2003; Richards and Patterson 2004; Sudhir and Rao 2006), and the case of these 
payments from a public policy perspective (e.g., Bone, France, and Riley 2006; Wilkie, 
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Desrochers, and Gundlach 2002).  However, empirical research in this area remains 
scarce.   
The work which has been put forth tends to focus on the case of powerful 
retailers requiring manufacturers to pay fees to gain distribution of a new product.  Little 
effort has been put into investigating the incidence of manufacturers wanting to pay fees 
as a way to gain product distribution, develop brands, build market share, grow top line 
revenue, and improve bottom line results.  Additionally, very little, if anything, is known 
about the unintended consequences of sellers paying such fees and allowances.  
Specifically, do these downstream channel allowances undermine the salesperson‘s 
influence over the customer and harm his/her ability to acquire customer loyalty?   
Thus, I propose to investigate the use of these payments by selling firms in terms 
of both occurrence and magnitude.  Relying on the guidance of cognitive evaluation 
theory, I set forth hypotheses which posit an undermining effect of two key relational 
elements between the customer and salesperson (i.e., salesperson influence and customer 
loyalty).  Based on prior research, additional main effect hypotheses are stated and 
combine with the moderator hypotheses to form the overall research model.  This model 
is presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH MODEL 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter a research model is presented which has been developed from the idea that 
low perceived salesperson control of channel allowances, from the customer‘s point of 
view, may have the unintended consequences of undermining relational elements 
important to the salesperson (i.e., salesperson influence and customer loyalty).  
Antecedents to salesperson influence (see the SITs taxonomy in chapter 2).  Therefore, 
these antecedents are not included in the model or the data collection and analysis phase 
of the study.   
 The research model depicted in figure 3-1 below indicates several anticipated 
relationships among the variables.  Two of the key main effect relationships involve 
variables related to influence and loyalty.  In regard to influence, salesperson influence is 
expected to be positively related to salesperson performance which is the expected to 
have a positive relationship with selling-firm performance (i.e., sales volume).  In terms 
of loyalty, the customer investments engaged in by the salesperson (i.e., frequency of 
sales calls) and selling firm (i.e., amount of allowances to be paid) are expected to be 
positively related to salesperson-owned loyalty.   
In terms of moderation, low perceived salesperson control of channel allowances 
is hypothesized to diminish the positive effect of salesperson influence on salesperson 
performance.  Conversely, high perceived control is expected to enhance this 
relationship.    Further, low perceived salesperson control of these payments is 
hypothesized to reduce the positive effect of customer investments on salesperson-owned 
loyalty while high control is expected to strengthen this positive relationship.  All of 
these undermining and enhancing effects may be hidden from the selling firm due to the 
short-term positive impact on selling firm performance from simply paying channel 
allowances.  At the firm level, these payments may appear to be working very well while 
the hidden, unintended consequences result in the salesperson‘s position, in relation to 
the customer, being compromised.  These relationships are illustrated in the structural 
model below.  
Additional effects are anticipated among the loyalty variables, outcome variables, 
and the customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s control of channel allowances.   
 
 
FIGURE 3.1 
OVERALL RESEARCH MODEL  
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Specifically, and consistent with prior research, salesperson-owned loyalty is 
expected to have a positive direct effect on firm-owned loyalty (Palmatier, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp 2007).  Salesperson-owned loyalty is hypothesized to have a positive direct 
effect on salesperson performance while firm-owned loyalty has a positive direct effect 
on the selling firm performance.  Note that all of the variables in the model have either a 
positive direct effect or a positive indirect effect on the selling firm performance.  Thus, 
this provides the rational as to why the negative or positive effects of perceived 
salesperson control of channel allowances on the variables related to the salesperson are 
not obvious to firm-level managers.  This provides the motivation for the current research 
which is to explore the unintended consequences of the undermining effect that low 
perceived salesperson control of such payments may have on the customer-salesperson 
relationship. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Salesperson Influence 
From the perspective of the customer, the salesperson may be viewed as a provider of 
information, a close ally in business, or a consultant in the process of making important 
decisions. In contrast, a salesperson may also be viewed as a consumer of time, a spy for 
the competition, and someone to be avoided until needed. Ironically, when considering 
two salespeople working for the same firm and selling the identical product line, one 
could be viewed by the customer in terms of positive characteristics, while the other in 
terms of negative ones. The difference between these salespeople may simply be each 
one‘s ability to choose the appropriate influence tactic and to use it correctly. 
 The antecedents of salesperson influence have been thoroughly investigated by 
scholars (Boyle and Dwyer 1995; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Summers 
1984; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; and Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995).  
Additionally, several other marketing scholars have used the salesperson influence 
variable in studying interpersonal influence across various context (see Kohli 1989; 
Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995; Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; and McFarland 
2003).  However McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) provide the most recent 
empirically tested taxonomy of influence tactics that are most often used by salespeople. 
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This set of six distinct influence methods includes information exchange, 
recommendations, threats, promises, ingratiation, and inspirational appeals. As presented 
in chapter 2, each of these methods combine to form what is referred to as ―salesperson 
influence tactics‖ (SITs).   
 
Customer Investments 
Customer investments are investments of time (i.e., sales calls) made by the 
salesperson and money (i.e., channel allowances) made by the selling firm in relation to a 
particular customer.  It is assumed for the current study that both of these investments are 
of benefit to the customer and thus should have a positive impact on customer loyalty.  
Customer investments are intended to be both relationship enhancing (e.g., via customer 
service through sales calls) and performance enhancing (e.g., via channel allowance 
payments).  Customer investments as operationalized in the current study are similar in 
nature to the ‗relationship enhancing activities‘ put forth by Palmatier, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp (2007).  That is, the relationship enhancing activities scale is essentially a 
measure of time and monetary inputs by the salesperson with benefits flowing to the 
customer.  However, this measure of relationship enhancing activities is a self-report 
measure and some element of secondary data was more desirable in the current study. 
Beyond that, it is suggested here, and consistent with Palmatier et al‘s (2007) finding 
when assessing relationship enhancing activities, that customer investments have a 
positive direct effect on salesperson-owned loyalty. 
 
Salesperson- and Firm-Owned Loyalty 
Prior to Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007), one shortcoming of customer 
loyalty measures was that these measures did not distinguish between customer loyalties 
toward a selling firm versus customer loyalties toward a salesperson.  The risk that 
selling firm‘s were exposed to in the event that a salesperson left the organization were 
not fully captured under these previous measures.  However, Palmatier et al (2007) take a 
significant step toward delineating these two forms of loyalty by assessing to whom the 
customer‘s loyalty belongs.  Customer loyalty flowing to the salesperson is termed 
‗salesperson-owned loyalty‘ and is expected to have a positive spill-over effect onto 
customer loyalty toward the firm (i.e., firm-owned loyalty).  Validated maeasures exist 
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for both forms of customer loyalty and will be adapted to fit the context of the current 
study.    
 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
Salesperson Performance with the Customer and Selling Firm Performance 
Performance is determined by a salesperson‘s ability to meet or exceed the expectations 
of sales managers as well as the attainment of other relevant organizational objectives.  
Brown and Peterson (1993) suggest that sales performance is an end in itself.  However, 
the proposed research model takes this notion a step further by linking salesperson 
performance with specific selling firm performance.  As opposed to viewing salesperson 
performance as ―good‖ or ―bad‖, I suggest that a salesperson‘s performance should be 
considered in relation to other variables beyond the salesperson‘s control; for example, 
the selling firm‘s decision to offer perceived salesperson control of channel allowances. 
Salespeople must are also expected to achieve the desired level of performance in 
a dynamic environment by altering sales strategies and approaches depending on the 
situation (Weitz, Sujan, and Sujan 1986).  In terms of improving performance, some 
recommendations by Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) are offered to increase customer 
satisfaction.  Specifically, these authors suggest that a salesperson can play a positive 
role between the organization and the buying firm by serving as an effective 
communicator for both parties.  However, to the extent that actions taken by the selling 
firm are undermining the salesperson‘s ability to manage the customer relationship, the 
salesperson‘s role as communicator and persuader may become unnecessarily difficult.   
In regard to the current study, the salesperson‘s individual performance will be 
assessed from the customer‘s perspective using an adapted version of a previously 
validated measure (Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar 1994).  In addition to salesperson 
performance, a key outcome variable at the firm level is considered here, that is, sales 
volume.  Specifically, sales growth with a particular customer is anticipated to benefit 
from higher levels of salesperson- and firm-owned loyalty.  Sales growth with a 
customer is measured through year-over-year sales volume growth the time period of the 
study.   
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MODERATOR VARIABLE 
Perceived Salesperson Control of Channel Allowances 
In a traditional buyer-seller exchange a product or service flows from the seller to the 
customer while financial consideration flows from the customer back to the seller.  This 
is a common type of exchange studied by marketing scholars.  This type of exchange 
may take place between a business and a consumer or between two businesses.  In the 
business-to-business exchange the practice of sellers paying customers to buy, or from a 
different perspective, sellers paying customers in order to sell, has become increasingly 
common.  This pay-to-play phenomenon goes by many names across multiple industries.  
Specific to the marketing literature, this practice is referred to as slotting fees, display 
fees, failure fees, pay-to-stay fees, presentation fees, and merchandising allowances 
among others.   However, there is a fundamental problem with using multiple terms, 
often in a generic way, to describe all such pay-to-play practices.   
First, the most common of these terms, slotting fee, is somewhat outdated when 
used generically in the marketplace.  The term ―slotting fee‖ was originally used in 
reference to manufacturers paying for ‗slots‘ in the warehouse of a distributor.  There 
were costs associated with adding products in the warehouse so a slotting fee was 
charged to the manufacturer as a way of transferring those costs.  Today, the term 
slotting fee is used to describe many different arrangements such as paying for shelf 
space in a retail store or paying for product placement on a website.  For further insight 
into to lack of clarity surrounding the term slotting fee or allowance, refer to table 3-2 
below  
Second, the term has become outdated from a legal perspective.  For example, 
when the Federal Trade Commission (2003) questioned retail customers regarding the 
practice of slotting fees, customers frequently stated that their company did not charge 
nor except slotting fees.  While technically true, many of these companies did extract 
payments from sellers in other ways such as promotional and advertising allowances, 
failure fees, or charge-backs.  While these practices are not technically ―slotting fees‖, 
they are effectively the same.  That is, financial consideration being paid by the seller to 
the customer in exchange for access to a downstream distribution channel. 
 Third, these fees and allowances are not solely being charged by customers to 
sellers.  In fact, manufacturing firms frequently offer payment, in these many forms, as a 
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way to gain access within a channel of distribution.  For example, a consumer goods 
manufacturer may offer a merchandising allowance to a retailer in exchange for 
distribution or additional space in the retailer‘s store.  Similarly, an appliance 
manufacturer may offer payment, in some form, to a home builder in exchange for 
placement of the manufacturer‘s appliances in model homes.  The possible forms of 
payment are virtually endless and the exchange partners too numerous to count when 
attempting to investigate this pervasive phenomenon. 
 Thus, in an effort to combine all of these various payments into one concept and 
to allow for concise study, I propose the conceptualization of ‗downstream channel 
allowances‘ to describe the process of financial consideration flowing from a seller to a 
customer with the outcome of gaining access to a distribution channel controlled by a 
downstream channel partner (e.g., the customer).   
 
 
TABLE 3.2 
Downstream Channel Allowance Practices - Terminology and Definitions
1,2
 
 
Common Term   Definition 
 
Appointment Fees   Fees for making new product presentation appointment (Gundlach and Bloom 1998, p.  
174). 
 
Display Fees    Fees paid for special merchandising and display of products (Bloom, Gundlach, and  
Cannon 2000, p. 93). 
 
Failure Fees    Fees paid when a product does not meet expected goals (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon  
2000, p. 93). 
 
Introductory Allowance  Free product or monetary discount related to the agreed upon purchase of a new  
product. Usually tied to a purchase and remain largely consistent across customer-seller 
exchanges for a given product (e.g., White et al 2000; Cannon and Bloom 1991). 
 
Maintenance Fees   Fees to keep a new product on store shelves or maintain slow-moving products or all  
products in general (Gundlach and Bloom 1998, p. 174). 
 
Merchandising Allowance  A fee that manufacturers pay retailers to encourage them to allocate certain in-store  
promotional activities to the manufacturer‘s brand(s) (Rennhoff 2004, p. 1). 
 
Pay-to-Stay Fees   Fees paid to continue stocking and displaying a product (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon  
2000, p. 93). 
 
Presentation Fees   Fees paid for the privilege of making a sales presentation (Bloom, Gundlach, and  
Cannon 2000, p. 93). 
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TABLE 3.2, CONTINUED 
 
Shelf Access Fees   A variety of payments made by sellers to retailers including slotting fees, pay-to-stay  
fees, as well as payments made in an effort to exclude rivals or place them in a poor position on 
the retail shelf (e.g., Wolburg 2003). 
 
Slotting Fees    Up-front payments of cash, promotional dollars, or merchandise to obtain shelf space for  
A product (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000, p. 93). 
 
Stocking Allowances   Fees for price cuts made on existing products to make room for a new product (Gundlach  
And Bloom 1998, p. 174). 
 
Upfront Payments    Fixed fees paid by manufacturers to retailers ostensibly to obtain access to shelf space,  
defray upfront costs, and support downstream promotional activities (Marx and Schaffer 2007, 
p. 823). 
 
 
1
The terms ―Fee(s)‖ and ―Allowance(s)‖ are used interchangeably in the literature. 
 
2
Other terms used in the literature to refer to this practice include, but are not limited to, the following: Advertising Allowance,  
  Charge-Back, Key Money, Marketing Premium, Negative Allowances, New Product Fee, Promotional Allowance, Stock Buy-Out  
  Fees, Street Money, and Write-Down. 
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CONTROL VARIABLES 
The current study seeks to understand the impact, based on the customer‘s perceptions, 
of the salesperson‘s control over channel allowances.  Given this goal, it is important that 
the customer providing survey data is familiar with both the salesperson in question and 
the channel allowances paid by the selling firm.  Thus, in order to more fully investigate 
the relationships between the variables in this study, it is important to control for two key 
variables, customer familiarity with the salesperson and the allowances paid by the 
selling firm. This important because the customer is the primary source of data regarding 
relational aspects of both the salesperson and channel allowances.  Therefore, a basic 
level of familiarity is required.  Both control variables will be assessed with single item 
survey measures.  In addition, both of these items will serve as informant checks when 
screening data provided by survey respondents.   
 
HYPOTHESES 
SALESPERSON INFLUENCE AND PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES 
McFarland, Challagalla, Shervani (2006) explore the use of salesperson influence tactics 
in relation to three distinct customer orientations; task, self, and interaction orientation.  
However, the authors do not tie the use of influence strategies based on the SITs 
taxonomy to actual salesperson performance. Considering the essential nature of 
‗performance‘ in the selling profession this leaves an important knowledge gap to be 
filled. Further, little, if any, empirical testing has been conducted which links the use of 
salesperson influence methods to salesperson performance with the customer.  Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is stated. 
 
H1a:  Salesperson influence positively affects salesperson performance  
with the customer. 
 
H1b:  Salesperson performance positively affects selling firm performance. 
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SALESPERSON-OWNED LOYALTY AND PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES 
 
Prior research demonstrated support for the positive effect of salesperson-owned loyalty, 
as derived from relationship enhancing activities, on firm-owned loyalty and selling firm 
financial outcomes as well as a direct positive effect of firm-owned loyalty on selling 
firm financial outcomes (Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007).  The current research 
seeks to provide further support for these findings and advance knowledge by empirically 
assessing the affect of customer investments on salesperson-owned loyalty as well the 
affect of salesperson-owned loyalty on salesperson performance with the customer and 
firm-owned loyalty.  Further, it is suggested here that firm-owned loyalty has a direct 
positive effect on selling firm performance.  Although the focus of this study is on the 
customer-salesperson relationship, the effects of salesperson-owned loyalty may be 
combined with customer loyalty to the firm if firm-owned loyalty were excluded.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are put forth. 
 
H2a:  Customer Investments positively affect salesperson-owned loyalty. 
 
H2b:  Salesperson-owned loyalty positively affects salesperson  
performance with the customer. 
 
H2c:  Salesperson-owned loyalty positively affects firm-owned loyalty. 
 
H2d:  Firm-owned loyalty positively affects selling firm performance. 
 
 
PERCEIVED SALESPERSON CONTROL OF CHANNEL ALLOWANCES AS A MODERATOR 
It is argued here that a salesperson‘s actual influence on a customer is not determined 
solely by the effort of the salesperson.  Rather, the salesperson‘s influence is determined 
by a combination of potential factors (e.g., individual and situational).  In relation to the 
current investigation, a salesperson‘s influence is determined by the salesperson‘s effort 
to influence the customer (e.g., providing recommendations) and the customer‘s 
perceptions (i.e., perceived salesperson control of channel allowances).  It is suggested 
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here that the customer‘s perceptions regarding the salesperson‘s control over allowances 
moderates the relationship between customer investments and salesperson-owned loyalty 
and salesperson influence and the salesperson‘s performance with the customer (see 
figure 3.2 below).  In support of this approach, prior research on salesperson influence 
has studied the comingling of individual resources and behaviors in determining the 
impact of a salesperson‘s influence (e.g., Kohli 1989).  Thus, the following hypotheses 
are put forth. 
 
H3a:  High (Low) perceived salesperson control of channel allowances 
enhances (diminishes) the positive effect of customer investments on 
salesperson- owned loyalty. 
 
H3b:  High (Low) perceived salesperson control of channel allowances 
enhances (diminishes) the positive effect of salesperson influence on 
salesperson performance with the customer. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2 
Theoretical Model of Moderation Hypotheses 
    
            
6
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SUMMARY 
 In this chapter, a research model is presented which has been derived from the 
hypothesized effects and is proposed with the aim of empirically testing the relationships 
among multiple variables of interest in a business-to-business selling context.  The 
primary contribution of this research is to uncover the hidden, unintended consequences 
to the health of the customer-salesperson relationship in the presence of channel 
allowances.  Additional contributions of this research include connecting the influence 
and loyalty variables directly to salesperson performance and illustrating how these 
positive effects contribute to salesperson- and firm-level performance outcomes.   
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The assessment of the proposed structural model and relationships among the constructs 
of interest will require survey data gathered at the customer level and secondary data 
provided at the firm level.  A number of main effects will be tested along with a series of 
moderation effects.  In regard to the moderation analysis, the customer‘s perception of 
the salesperson‘s control over channel allowances is hypothesized to diminish the 
positive effect of salesperson influence on salesperson performance as well as the 
positive effect of customer investments on salesperson-owned loyalty.  In terms of 
mediation effects, the positive effect of salesperson influence on selling-firm financial 
outcomes expected to operate through salesperson performance.  Along these same lines, 
salesperson-owned loyalty operates through salesperson performance and firm-owned 
loyalty to positively impact the firm-level outcome variables.  The research setting and 
design are discussed next. 
 
RESEARCH SETTING 
The focus of the current study is the customer-seller relationship and the role of channel 
allowances as a mechanism that affects the anticipated benefits of salesperson influence 
and customer investments.  Therefore, the required sample will consist of data from 
customers and marketing managers.  The research effort will require a sufficient sample 
of matched customer-salesperson dyads.   
For the purposes of this dissertation, it would be preferable to use industrial 
salespeople (i.e., business-to-business) as opposed to retail salespeople (i.e., business-to-
consumer).  The reason for this preference is that retail salespeople are often engaged in 
one-time sales exchanges in which the desire to build a long-term relationship is 
decidedly one-sided; that is, the seller would enjoy establishing a relationship to 
encourage future sales while the customer most likely will seek the best offer when the 
need arises in the future as opposed to relying on an established relationship.  
Conversely, in the context of industrial sales, the customer is making a purchase decision 
based on the need to maximize profit for the buying organization.  Thus, building a long-
term relationship with a salesperson may be equally important, if not more important, to 
 
64 
 
the customer in comparison to the seller.  Another reason that a sample of industrial 
salespeople is most appropriate for this study is that channel allowances occur more 
frequently, if not exclusively, in a business-to-business context.  For a more accurate 
assessment of variance, both the presence and absence of these payments across the total 
sample would be desirable. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Following the recommendation of Podsakoff et al. (2003), measurement of the research 
variables will be administered in an effort to minimize the negative consequences of 
common method bias.  Specifically, Podsakoff et al. (2003) recommend collecting the 
type of data that is required in the current study from multiple sources.  With this in 
mind, the variables in the research model will be collected from different sources.  For 
example, a measure of salesperson influence will be completed by the customer while a 
measure of selling firm performance will be provided by the marketing manager.  Based 
on the purpose of this study, it is not recommended to collect all variables in the model 
from different sources.  For example, when assessing how much influence the 
salesperson has on the customer and how much loyalty the customer has toward the 
salesperson, and in the absence of representative secondary data, the most accurate 
source of this data would be the customer.  With only two options available as potential 
sources of data (i.e., salesperson and customer), the customer is likely to provide more 
objective and accurate information.  In addition, a focal point of this study is the 
customer‘s perceptions. Hence, it would make little sense to ask the salesperson 
regarding these issues. 
In sum, data for salesperson influence, salesperson performance with the 
customer, and firm-owned loyalty will be provided by the customer.  Secondary data 
regarding customer investments and selling firm performance will be provided by the 
marketing manager.  See table 4-1 for a summary of research variables and data 
collection methods. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 
Research Variables and Data Collection Method 
 
Measurement                        Customer   Firm Level 
    Variable                                                                       Survey Data                           Secondary Data  
 
Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances                    X           X 
 
Salesperson Influence              X 
 
Customer Investments                       X            X 
 
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty            X 
 
Firm-Owned Loyalty             X 
 
Salesperson Performance w/ Customer                    X 
 
Selling-Firm Performance                  X 
 Sales Growth to the Customer 
 
Channel allowance 
 Occurrence            X            X 
 Magnitude                                                   X
6
5
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MEASUREMENT OF RESEARCH VARIABLES 
PERCEIVED SALESPERSON CONTROL OF ALLOWANCES 
The customer‘s perceptions of the salesperson‘s control over channel allowances are of 
particular interest in this study.  However, the literature lacks any measure that will allow 
this variable to be properly assessed.  Therefore, a scale will have to be developed which 
accurately represents this key construct.  Specifically, a measure will be developed, 
which is to be completed from the customer‘s perspective, of how much control the 
salesperson has on the allowances the selling-firm pays.  A number of sources (e.g., - 
Churchill 1979, Gerbing and Anderson 1988) provide guidance to aid the researcher in 
the scale development process. Based on recommendations from such prior research, the 
scale development process will include the following steps; item generation based on the 
conceptualization of the construct, an assessment of content and face validity through the 
use of expert judging, and reliability, dimensionality, and further validity testing. 
While the current study is primarily interested in the customer‘s perceptions of 
the salesperson‘s control of these allowances, data regarding the occurrence (i.e., 
frequency) and magnitude (i.e., amount) of the payments will be gathered as well.  The 
variable representing the perceived salesperson control over channel allowances acts 
solely as a moderator variable in this research model.  Data will be collected from the 
customer and the selling-firm (to serve as a cross-check on customer data) regarding the 
occurrence of these payments and from the selling firm regarding the magnitude.  Refer 
to table 4-2 below for a summary of the measures to be used in the current study 
 
SALESPERSON INFLUENCE 
Salesperson influence is the actual influence which the salesperson holds over the 
customer‘s decision making and has been shown to flow from the use of the salesperson 
influence tactics (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006).  An adapted measure of 
manifest influence is provided by McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006) and is 
further adapted here as ‗salesperson influence‘.  This validated measure will be 
completed by the customer in an effort to assess the level of influence the salesperson 
possesses within the customer-salesperson dyad. 
 
 
TABLE 4.2 
Model Variables – Measures to be Developed/Adapted, Method, and Source* 
 
Variable & Measure       Method     Source 
 
Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances (PSCA)  Secondary Data    Selling Firm 
1. My (firm) salesperson controls the allowances Pepsi provides to us. 
2. My (firm) salesperson has the ability to increase or decrease the allowances we receive. 
3. I typically negotiate allowances from (firm) with my salesperson. 
4. My (firm) salesperson has the authority to make decisions regarding our allowances. 
5. My (firm) salesperson controls the amount of the allowances we receive. 
6. My (firm) salesperson controls the frequency with which our allowances are paid. 
7. (Firm) empowers its salespeople to control the allowances we receive from them. 
8. My (firm) salesperson rarely brings his/her manager to meeting when allowances are discussed. 
9. My (firm) salesperson rarely has to seek approval when making decisions regarding our allowances. 
10. All matters relating to our (firm) allowances are handled by our salesperson. 
 
 
Salesperson Influence
a
 (SI)      Survey Data     Customer 
1.   How much weight did you give to the salesperson‘s opinions before buying? 
2.   To what extent did the salesperson‘s involvement influence your choices? 
3.   How much impact did the salesperson have on your purchase decisions? 
4.   To what extent did you go along with the salesperson‘s suggestions? 
5.   How much weight did you give the salesperson‘s statements in making you purchase decisions? 
6.   To what extent did your decisions reflect the salesperson‘s influence? 
7.   To what extent did the salesperson influence the criteria used for making purchase decisions? 
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TABLE 4.2, CONTINUED 
 
Customer Investments     Survey and Secondary Data   Customer/Selling Firm  
1. Average number of sales calls made on a given customer per week. 
2. The channel allowance payment amount on a per case basis. 
 
 
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty
b
      Survey Data     Customer 
1. If my salesperson moved to a new firm with similar products, I would likely shift some of my purchases to this 
salesperson‘s new firm. 
2. I would do less business with this firm in the next few years, if my salesperson changed. 
3. I would be less loyal to this firm, if my salesperson moved to a new firm. 
4. I feel greater loyalty toward my salesperson than to this firm. 
5. I would recommend this salesperson to my coworkers even if this salesperson changed firms. 
6. If this salesperson changed companies, I would recommend this salesperson to others in my company. 
 
 
Firm-Owned Loyalty
b 
      Survey Data     Customer 
1. For my next purchase, I will consider this firm as my first choice. 
2. I will do more business with this firm in the next few years than I do right now. 
3. All else being equal, I plan to buy from this firm in the future. 
4. I say positive things about this firm to my coworkers. 
5. I would recommend this firm to someone seeking my advice. 
6. I encourage friends and coworkers to do business with this firm. 
 
 
Salesperson Performance with Customer
c
    Survey Data     Customer 
1. Contributing to your company's acquiring a good market share. 
2. Selling high profit-margin products. 
6
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TABLE 4.2, CONTINUED 
 
3. Generating a high level of dollar sales. 
4. Quickly generating sales of new company products. 
5. Identifying major accounts in your territory and selling to them. 
6. Exceeding sales targets. 
7. Assisting your sales supervisor meet his or her goals. 
 
Selling Firm Performance      Secondary Data    Selling Firm 
1. Sales growth to customer 
 
 
Control Variables / Key Informant Checks    Survey Data     Customer 
1. How familiar are you with your Pepsi sales representative? 
2. How familiar are you with the allowances you receive from Pepsi? 
 
 
*See Appendix for the finalized survey instrument 
a
McFarland, Challagalla, & Shervani (2006) 
b
Palmatier, Scheer, & Steenkamp (2007) 
c
Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar (1994)
6
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CUSTOMER INVESTMENTS 
Customer investments combine two key inputs on the part of the salesperson and selling 
firm with the customer, that is, time and money.  These investments are operationalized 
here in the form of the number of sales calls a salesperson makes on a customer over a 
given period of time and the amount channel allowances paid to a customer on a per case 
basis.  Such investments are expected to engender loyalty from the customer which, in 
the context of this study, is referred to as salesperson-owned loyalty (Palmatier, Scheer, 
and Steenkamp 2007).  Customer investments will measured using customer level survey 
data (i.e., average number of sales calls per week) and firm level secondary data (i.e., 
channel allowance amount per case). 
 
SALESPERSON- AND FIRM-OWNED LOYALTY 
A customer may have a certain level of loyalty to the salesperson, the selling firm, or a 
combination of both.  A selling firm may assume that all loyalty from a customer is 
directed at the firm and allow no room for customer loyalty directed exclusively at the 
salesperson.  In some instances, a portion of the customer‘s loyalty is directed to 
salesperson but is combined with other loyalties and considered as overall loyalty to the 
selling firm.  Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) refer to this mistaken allocation 
of customer loyalty as ‗illusory loyalty‘.  This is customer loyalty that does not exist for 
the benefit of the firm and in fact exposes the firm to risk in the event that the salesperson 
leaves the company.  Therefore, when a salesperson exits an organization, the value of 
that individual‘s performance is lost; however, in terms of customer loyalty, all may not 
be lost. Some of the accrued value (e.g., goodwill toward the selling firm and/or its 
products) may remain. Thus, two separate measures used to assess a customer‘s loyalty 
toward the salesperson and the firm have been developed by Palmatier, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp (2007).  These instruments will be used in the current study as well. 
 
SALESPERSON AND SELLING FIRM PERFORMANCE 
In previous sales research, salesperson performance has been assessed by using criteria 
such as sales volume, dollar sales, evaluations, and self-report measures (Krishnan, 
Netemeyer, and Boles, 2002).  Rentz et. al. (2002) posits that selling skills; including 
technical skills, salesmanship skills, and interpersonal skills; are important when 
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attempting to predict salesperson performance as well.  Thus, for the proposed study, 
individual salesperson performance will be measured at the customer level using an 
adapted scale based on a measure which has been previously validated by Sujan, Weitz, 
& Kumar (1994).  In addition to salesperson performance, sales growth to the customer 
(i.e., selling firm performance) will be assessed using secondary data provided by the 
marketing manager.   
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
In order to more fully investigate the relationships between the variables in this study, it 
is important to control for two key variables, customer familiarity with the salesperson 
and the allowances paid by the selling firm. This important because the customer is the 
primary source of data regarding relational aspects of both the salesperson and channel 
allowances.  Therefore, a basic level of familiarity is required.  Both control variables 
will be assessed with single items on the survey.  In addition, both of these items will be 
used as key informant checks to screen survey respondents.  It would be ill-advised to 
include customers in the final data pool who may lack familiarity with either the 
salesperson or the channel allowances.  A customer cannot be expected to respond with 
any confidence or accuracy to items assessing an unfamiliar area.
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DATA COLLECTION AND PREPARATION 
 
Primary data will be collected at the customer level using an electronic survey developed 
specifically for this study.  Surveys will be sent via email to customers in a Word 
document designed to allow for customers to respond by selecting a response without 
altering the rest of the document in any way.  Surveys may be returned by email, fax, or 
mail as full contact information will be provided with the survey.  Survey data will be 
coded and entered into an excel spreadsheet and then imported into SPSS 12.0 and 
AMOS 7.0 for analysis.   
Secondary data will be provided by the selling firm and, if necessary, converted 
to an Excel spreadsheet.  This data will then be added to the survey data and analyzed 
using SPSS 12.0 and AMOS 7.0 as needed.  Missing data will coded as ‗blank‘ and 
replaced with the mean barring the occurrence of excessive missing data.  For example, if 
an entire page of the survey or the majority of a measure is left blank then that customer 
will be removed from the sample.  All scaled variables will be mean centered to 
minimize the potential effects of multicollinearity. 
 
MEASUREMENT VALIDATION  
 
The scale development process for the measure of perceived salesperson control will be 
treated differently from the validate measures used in this study.  The items for the 
perceived control scale will be subjected to principal components analysis using 
SPSS12.0 with a minimum eigenvalue of 1.00 used to identify the number of 
components.  The construct is expected to be unidimensional with factor loadings in 
excess of .60 or greater (Hair et al 1998).  The purified scale resulting from this process 
will be assessed using confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 12.0 and checked for 
model fit.  Once fit is determined to be acceptable, the latent construct along with the 
remaining indicators will be included in the overall measurement model. 
The psychometric properties (i.e., convergent validity, discriminant validity, and 
reliability) of the measurement variables and item indicators from previously validate 
scales will be assessed by performing confirmatory factor analysis on the variance-
covariance matrix.  Model fit will be determined by reporting the appropriate statistics; 
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χ
2
, df, p- value, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA (Byrne 1998).  Internal consistency of each 
measure will be assessed and Cronbach‘s alpha will be reported (Cronbach 1951).   
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Assuming all measures are found to be both valid and reliable, the individual direct 
relationships hypothesized in the research model will be tested by initially using multiple 
regression in SPSS 12.0 accounting for the appropriate control variables.  The 
relationships which are established with significance, and those nearing significance, will 
be included in the overall research model and tested using AMOS 7.0.  The moderator 
hypotheses will be tested next.  Of primary interest in this analysis will be the 
hypothesized moderation effect of perceived salesperson control of allowances on two 
key relationships (see Figure 4.1a and Figure 4.1b). 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1A 
 
Perceived Salesperson Control of Channel Allowance Moderation of the  
Positive Effect of Salesperson Influence on Salesperson Performance 
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FIGURE 4.1B 
Perceived Salesperson Control of Channel Allowance Moderation of the  
Positive Effect of Customer investments on Salesperson-Owned Loyalty 
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Multigroup analysis, a method of testing for moderation within structural models 
is commonly used in prior research (e.g., Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007).  This 
method requires that a high and low group be established for the moderator of interest by 
using a median split of the sample.  For the current analysis, the multigroup method will 
be used for model testing in AMOS 7.0.  First, the two groups resulting from the median 
spilt must be specificied.  In this instance, there will be a ‗high control‘ and a ‗low 
control‘ group.  Then, using a chi-sqaure difference test two models are compared.   For 
testing of the first model all hypothesized paths are constrained to be equal across both 
groups.  The resulting chi-squae is then compare with a second model in which the path 
hypothesized to be moderated is unconstrained and allowed to vary across the two 
groups.  Support for moderation is indicated if the chi-square of the unconstrained model 
is significantly less than the chi-square for the constrained model and the effect is found 
to be in the anticipated direction.  In addition to the analysis prescribed above, other 
statistical tests and procedures may be conducted as needed based on both the data 
collected and the post hoc analysis conducted. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, data analysis procedures are explained and the results of the study are 
presented.  First, the response rate is discussed along with an assessment of non-response 
bias.  Then, the data screening process using a series of key informant checks which are 
included within the survey is covered.  Next, a discussion of how the data was prepared 
prior to analysis is discussed followed by a description of the scale development process 
adhered to in creating a measure to assess the customer‘s perceived salesperson control 
over allowances.  Then, measurement validation is explained followed by a discussion of 
the procedures used for hypothesis testing.  The chapter concludes with a consideration 
of post hoc analysis and a summary of the overall results. 
 
RESPONSE RATE 
The context of this study is the U.S. soft drink industry with a specific focus on the 
relationship between soft drink salespeople and retail store managers.  A total of 180 
convenience store managers were initially identified as participants in the survey mailing.  
Convenience store chain ‗A‘ represented 112 potential respondents and chain ‗B‘ 
represented 68 respondents.  All of the targeted store managers received the survey by 
email.  Although some of the completed surveys were returned by fax, most were 
returned to an email address created specifically for this study.   
Of the 112 store managers from chain A 81 responded with completed surveys 
representing a response rate of 72.3% for chain A.  Of the 68 store managers from chain 
B 61 responded with a completed survey representing a response rate of 89.7% for chain 
B.  In total, 142 of the original 180 store managers surveyed returned completed surveys 
for an overall response rate of 78.9% for the study. 
 
NON-RESPONSE BIAS 
When conducting survey research it is important to assess differences between those who 
respond to the survey versus those who do not respond.  Armstrong and Overton (1977) 
offer a method for comparing these two groups of participants, that is, respondents and 
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non-respondents.  The rational for this method is that late responders are similar to non-
responders.  This presents the opportunity to use late responders as a proxy measure of 
non-response bias.  The technique put forth by Armstrong and Overton (1977) was used 
for the current study.  Specifically, mean differences for early responders (i.e., the first 
25% of completed surveys returned) was compared to late responders (i.e., the last 25% 
of completed surveys returned).  There were no significant mean differences (p > .05) 
found across the research variables of interest. 
 
KEY INFORMANT CHECK 
For the current study it was important that the survey respondents be screened based on 
two criteria, familiarity and involvement, with both the salesperson and the allowances 
paid by the selling firm.  Three key informant checks were included in the survey to 
ensure those customers providing completed surveys did in fact fit this profile.  The first 
key informant check assessed the extent to which the customer negotiated allowances 
with his/her sales representative (i.e., ―I typically negotiate allowances from Pepsi with 
my Pepsi salesperson‖).  This item was scored on a 7-point Likert scale with any 
respondent scoring below 5 (n = 6) being deleted from the sample.   
The second key informant check assessed the store manager‘s familiarity with 
his/her salesperson (i.e., ―How familiar are you with your Pepsi sales representative?‖).  
This item was scored on a 10-point scale from 1 being ―Not at all familiar‖ to 10 being 
―Very familiar‖.  Respondents scoring below 6 (n = 0) would have been deleted from the 
final data set.  However, there were no store managers reporting below the cut-off value 
for this informant check.   
As a final key informant check, store managers were assessed based on 
familiarity with the allowances paid by the selling firm (i.e., ―How familiar are you with 
the allowances you receive from Pepsi?‖).  This item was scored on a 10-point scale from 
1 being ―Not at all familiar‖ to 10 being ―Very familiar‖.  Respondents scoring below 6 
(n = 3) were deleted from the final data set.  These three deleted responses were also 
included and accounted for in a previously discussed key informant check.  In sum, 
screening respondents based on these key informant checks resulted in 6 participants 
being deleted from the data set leading to a final sample size of 136 store managers. 
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DATA PREPARATION 
Completed surveys were returned by email and fax based on the participants ability to 
reply.  The completed surveys were coded and entered into a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet.  Any missing data points were left blank.  The spreadsheet was imported 
into SPSS 15.0 for analysis.  Missing data was assesses and replaced with the item mean.  
Note that missing data was minimal across the sample and no single respondent 
presented with excessive missing data.   
As a preliminary measure, a principal components analysis was performed using 
all items in the survey which related to a latent construct of interest.  The PCA included 
35 variables expected to represent a total of 5 constructs.  Based on an eigenvalue cut-off 
of 1.00, 6 components were identified accounting for 78.9% of variance.  This was an 
indication that an additional factor was present and may present challenges in the CFA 
which was performed later.  One possibility, which was included in the CFA, is that of a 
method factor.  Since the survey data comes from a single source, the customer, common 
method bias may be an issue (Podsakoff et al 2003).  The presence of a method factor to 
significantly improve the model fit.  Although some items exhibited clear indications of 
cross loading on other latent constructs, all of the items were retained though the scale 
development process for the perceived salesperson control of allowances scale and the 
CFA of the remaining measures, each of which had been previously validated. 
 
MEASUREMENT OF STUDY VARIABLES 
 
PERCEIVED SALESPERSON CONTROL OF ALLOWANCES 
 
This study involved several variables of interest for which validated measures have been 
previously developed.  However, it was necessary to develop a measure to assess the 
customer‘s perceived salesperson control over the allowances in question.  Note that for 
the purposes of this research the actual control that a salesperson has over the allowances 
paid by the selling firm is not important.  But rather, this study is most interested in the 
customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s control over the allowances.  For example, 
when the customer asks the salesperson to increase the amount of an allowance does the 
salesperson respond with ―I will have to check with my manager to see if we can do that‖ 
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(indicates lower control) or ―Let me make some calculations and I will let you know if I 
can increase the allowance‖ (indicates higher control).   Thus, the actual control is not 
considered in the current study. 
The investigation into the impact allowances may have on the relationship 
between a customer and salesperson requires a new measure to be developed.  
Specifically, a measure, from the customer‘s perspective, of how much control the 
salesperson has on the allowances the selling-firm pays.  Thus, a measure was developed 
and is referred to here as the Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances (PSCA).  A 
number of sources (e.g., - Churchill 1979, Gerbing and Anderson 1988) were sought to 
provide guidance in the development of the PSCA scale. Based on recommendations 
from such prior research, the scale development process included item generation based 
on the conceptualization presented previously, followed by an assessment of content and 
face validity, and concluding with reliability, dimensionality, and further validity testing.    
The initial 16-items for the measure were developed by consulting the literature 
on allowances (e.g., - Sudhir and Rao 2006) and perceived control (e.g., - O‘Driscoll and 
Beehr 2000) in combination with one another.  As a way to assess content and face 
validity, these 16 items were subjected to expert judging.  Experts contributing to this 
step included a consumer goods salesperson familiar with allowances, a senior marketing 
manager also employed in consumer goods and familiar with allowances, and a 
university professor familiar with the literature on both perceived control and allowances.  
Based on feedback from this panel of experts the scale was edited for clarity and reduced 
to 10 items.   
The 10-item measure was further assessed through a pretest of the survey.  The 
purpose of the pretest was to assess the PSCA scale for clarity, dimensionality, and 
reliability.  Since other measures included in the survey were previously validated scales, 
the pretest also served to test the remainder of the survey for clarity and completion time.  
Pretest subjects consisted of senior level marketing students at a major mid-western 
university.  Participants were provided with a scenario which indicated they were to 
assume the role of a customer of a consumer goods company in the process of 
negotiating over display space.  The scenario indicated that when the customer (i.e., the 
participant) asked a question regarding the allowances being offered, the salesperson 
either responded in a way that indicated s/he was in control of the allowances or, 
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conversely, s/he responded in a way that indicated a lack of control on the salesperson‘s 
part.  The participants then completed the survey with the scenario in mind.  Although 
based on a small sample size (n=20), the pretest indicated that further revisions were 
necessary to improve clarity for future participants.  Thus, the 10-item measure was 
revised and included in the survey instrument developed for the current study.  
As part of the main study, the 10-item PSCA scale was first assessed using 
principal component analysis (PCA) in SPSS 15.0.  The PSCA scale was subjected to 
PCA using an eigenvalue of greater than 1.0 as a cut-off and employing varimax rotation.  
This resulted in one factor being identified and explaining 70.1% of the variance.  
However, due to a second component with an eigenvalue of .926 (close to 1.0) and a 
single item with lower than desired loading (.425), the items were assessed a second time 
using the same method but extracting a two-factor solution.  The results indicated that 
one item, item three, was clearly loading (.772) on a second factor and was subsequently 
deleted from the PSCA scale.   
Upon review, it was determined that the item removed, item 3, was important to 
this research in that it assesses whether or not the customer negotiates allowances with 
the salesperson.  Therefore, data associated with the item was included in the dataset and 
included as part of a three item key informant check.  Also in relation to the results of the 
two-factor solution, item 8 loaded on the second factor (.627) and item 9 indicated signs 
of cross loading (.538) on the second factor.  Thus, item 8 was deleted.  However, item 9 
indicated a loading of .616 on the primary factor and was retained for the following 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
The resulting 8-item PSCA scale was then subjected to confirmatory factor 
analysis.  The goodness-of-fit and modification indices suggested further scale 
purification was needed (χ
2
 (20) = 98.016, p<.01; RMSEA = .170; GFI = .852; AGFI = 
.734; NFI = .929; CFI = .942). Items 2 and 6 were removed based in part on suggestions 
in the modification indices.  In addition, item 2 appears to be redundant with item 5 in 
the measure.    
The respecified model (see Figure 5.1) achieved acceptable fit (χ
2
 (8) = 9.995 p = 
.265; RMSEA = .043; GFI = .977; AGFI = .940; NFI = .988; CFI = .998).  Using the 
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .75), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981) 
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent 
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validity for the measure of Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances.  Overall, this 
measure demonstrated factor loadings which ranged from .71 to .93 with composite 
reliability of .95, providing additional evidence of convergent validity. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.1 
CFA Measurement Model – Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances
1,2
 
 
1
Model fit: χ
2
 (2) = 4.131, p = .127; RMSEA = .089; GFI = .984; AGFI = .921; NFI = 
.987; CFI = .993 
2
Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity. 
 
 
CUSTOMER INVESTMENTS 
 
The variable ‗customer investments‘ captures two key investments, time and money, that 
the salesperson puts into the relationship with the customer.  In this case, ‗time‘ 
represents the number of sales calls made by a salesperson in relation to a particular 
customer.  Initially, an attempt was made to measure time based on sales call reports 
provided by the selling firm.  However, the record of sales calls across the customer 
sample was incomplete and severely lacking.  Therefore, the number of sales calls was 
assessed at the customer level by including an item on the survey.   
The secondary performance data spans a 16-week period so it was necessary to 
assess the number of sales calls over the same time period.  However, it is not realistic to 
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expect a customer to recall with any precision how often a salesperson called on him/her 
in the ‗past 16-weeks‘.  Based on this, the item included as part of the survey asks ―On 
average, how often does your salesperson call on you‖ with responses coded by week.  
The average number of calls per week as reported by the customer was them multiplied 
by 16 to arrive at the number of sales calls over the 16-week period in question. 
The ‗investment‘ element of ‗customer investments‘ was established based on the 
allowances due to the customer over the same 16-week period in which secondary 
performance data was provided.  Using the terminology of the selling firm, these 
payments are part of a ‗customer development agreement‘ (CDA) and are referred to as 
‗CDA payments‘.  These payments are negotiated based on a per case basis and typically 
require that certain performance criteria are met (e.g., minimum level of product 
portfolio distribution) throughout the life of the agreement (usually one calendar year).  
In addition to these allowances, salespeople can negotiate store level allowances to be 
paid for such outcomes as new product distribution which may include permanent shelf 
space or a temporary display to promote a certain product.  The former is referred to in 
the literature as a ‗slotting allowance‘ while the latter is referred to as a ‗display 
allowance‘ (e.g., Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000).  Note that the selling firm in this 
study refers to all in-store allowances related to products as ‗flex funding‘ indicating that 
it is in addition to allowances paid as part of the CDA contract.  Regardless of purpose, 
these allowances are accounted for and combined as a single payment made to the 
customer at a predetermined time, most often quarterly. 
For the overall measure of ‗customer investments‘, the number of sales calls and 
the dollar amount of allowances due on a per case basis were standardized and combined.  
The variable ‗customer investments‘ was not included as part of the CFA presented later 
in this chapter. 
 
SALESPERSON-OWNED LOYALTY 
 
The measure of Salesperson-Owned Loyalty (SOL) used for the current study was 
adapted from a scale which was validated in prior research (Palmatier, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp 2007).  Thus, the six item measure was subjected to confirmatory factor 
analysis.  Based on the initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices 
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indicated the model exhibited poor fit (χ
2
 (9) = 229.361, p < .01; RMSEA = .426; GFI = 
.656; AGFI = .197; NFI = .623; CFI = .628).  Therefore, further scale purification was 
necessary.  Both item five (SOL5) and six (SOL6) were removed due to low factor 
loadings, .54 and .55 respectively.   
The respecified model (see Figure 5.2) achieved acceptable fit (χ
2
 (2) = 4.131, p = 
.127; RMSEA = .089; GFI = .984; AGFI = .921; NFI = .987; CFI = .993). Using the 
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .67), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981) 
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent 
validity for the measure of salesperson-owned loyalty.  Overall, this measure 
demonstrated factor loadings which ranged from .72 to .95 with composite reliability of 
.89, providing additional evidence of convergent validity. 
 
FIGURE 5.2 
CFA Measurement Model – Salesperson-Owned Loyalty
1
 
 
1
Model fit: χ
2
 (2) = 4.131, p = .127; RMSEA = .089; GFI = .984; AGFI = .921; NFI = 
.987; CFI = .993 
 
 
FIRM-OWNED LOYALTY 
The measure of Firm-Owned Loyalty (FOL) used for the current study was adapted from 
a scale which was validated in prior research (Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007).  
Thus, the six item measure was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis.  Based on the 
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initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the model 
exhibited poor fit (χ
2
 (9) = 191.186, p<.01; RMSEA = .387; GFI = .332; AGFI = .662; 
NFI = .662; CFI = .670).  Therefore, further scale purification was necessary.  Both items 
four (FOL4) and six (FOL6) were removed due to low factor loadings, .52 and .43 
respectively.   
The respecified model (see Figure 5.3) achieved acceptable fit (χ
2
 (1) = .416, p = 
.519; RMSEA = .000; GFI = .998; AGFI = .985; NFI = .999; CFI = 1.000). Using the 
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .64), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981) 
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent 
validity for the measure of firm-owned loyalty.  Overall, this measure demonstrated 
factor loadings which ranged from .60 to .93 with composite reliability of .88, providing 
additional evidence of convergent validity. 
 
FIGURE 5.3 
CFA Measurement Model – Firm-Owned Loyalty
1,2
 
 
 
1
Model fit: χ
2
 (1) = .416, p = .519; RMSEA = .000; GFI = .998; AGFI = .985; NFI = 
.999; CFI = 1.000 
 
2
Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity. 
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SALESPERSON INFLUENCE 
 
The measure of Salesperson Influence used for the current study was adapted from a 
scale which was validated as a measure of salesperson manifest influence in prior 
research (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006).  Thus, the seven item measure 
was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis.  Based on the initial analysis, the 
goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the model exhibited less than 
acceptable fit (χ
2
 (14) = 84.8677, p<.01; RMSEA = .194; GFI = .847; AGFI = .693; NFI 
= .928; CFI = .938).  Therefore, further scale purification was necessary.  Based on 
recommendations provided in the modification indices, select error terms were correlated 
and the model was reassessed.   
The respecified model (see Figure 5.4) achieved acceptable fit (χ
2
 (9) = 15.267, p 
= .084; RMSEA = .072; GFI = .972; AGFI = .912; NFI = .987; CFI = .995). Using the 
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .79), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981) 
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent 
validity for the measure of firm-owned loyalty.  Overall, this measure demonstrated 
factor loadings which ranged from .82 to .96 with composite reliability of .96, providing 
additional evidence of convergent validity. 
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FIGURE 5.4 
CFA Measurement Model – Salesperson Influence
1,2 
 
 
 
1
Model fit: χ
2
 (9) = 15.267, p = .084; RMSEA = .072; GFI = .972; AGFI = .912; NFI = 
.987; CFI = .995 
2
Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity. 
 
SALESPERSON PERFORMANCE WITH THE CUSTOMER 
 
The measure of Salesperson Performance with the Customer used for the current study 
was adapted from a scale which was validated in prior research (Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar 
1994).  Thus, the six item measure was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis.  Based 
on the initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the model 
exhibited poor fit (χ
2
 (9) = 54.887, p<.01; RMSEA = .194; GFI = .874; AGFI = .707; 
NFI = .936; CFI = .946).  Therefore, further scale purification was necessary.  Based on 
recommendations provided in the modification indices, select error terms were correlated 
and the model was reassessed.   
The respecified model (see Figure 5.5) achieved acceptable fit (χ
2
 (8) = 12.722, p 
= .122; RMSEA = .066; GFI = .969; AGFI = .919; NFI = .985; CFI = .994). Using the 
average variance extracted as an indicator (AVE = .75), Fornell and Larcker‘s (1981) 
minimum recommendation (>.50) was met thus providing evidence of convergent 
validity for the measure of firm-owned loyalty.  Overall, this measure demonstrated 
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factor loadings which ranged from .74 to .96 with composite reliability of .95, providing 
additional evidence of convergent validity. 
 
FIGURE 5.5 
CFA Measurement Model – Salesperson Performance with Customer
1,2
 
 
 
1
Model fit: χ
2
 (8) = 12.722, p = .122; RMSEA = .066; GFI = .969; AGFI = .919; NFI = 
.985; CFI = .994 
 
2
Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity. 
 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Customer Familiarity with Allowances 
 
Although it is very important to ensure that customers participating in the survey have 
dealings with the allowances paid by the selling firm, it is desirable to control for the 
effects of ‗just being familiar‘ with this activity.  The study aims to understand the 
impact that these allowances have on the relationship of interest beyond simple 
familiarity with the practice.  Therefore, a single item (i.e., How familiar are you with the 
allowances you receive from Pepsi?) was used to assess this area of familiarity.  As with 
the previous familiarity measure, this item was also used as an informant check to screen 
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those customers who indicate a lack of familiarity with the salesperson (i.e., scoring < 6 
on a 1 to 10 scale).  This measure consists of a single-item reflective indicator and was 
not included in the CFA used to assess overall fit of the measurement model. 
 
Customer Familiarity with Salesperson 
Just as familiarity of the allowances is a necessary, although not sufficient, characteristic 
of survey respondents; the customer‘s familiarity with the salesperson is just as 
important.  This is due to the fact that this study is assessing the impact that a 
salesperson‘s control over allowances may have on his/her relationship with the 
customer.  Therefore, a single item (i.e., How familiar are you with your Pepsi sales 
representative?) was used to assess familiarity.  This item was also used as an informant 
check to screen those customers who indicate a lack of familiarity with the practice (i.e., 
scoring < 6 on a 1 to 10 scale).  This measure consists of a single-item reflective 
indicator and was not included in the CFA used to assess overall fit of the measurement 
model. 
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL 
 
Convergent validity of the individual constructs was supported and the next step was to 
test the overall measurement model (see Figure 5.6) which included all 5 constructs (i.e., 
latent variables) and 25 indicators (i.e., observed variables).   The model was assessed 
and based on the initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated 
the model exhibited poor fit (χ
2
 (9) = 54.887, p<.01; RMSEA = .194; GFI = .874; AGFI 
= .707; NFI = .936; CFI = .946).  The initial model was respecified and tested but fit 
improved only marginally.  From this point, multiple models were specified and assessed 
without any individual model nearing an acceptable fit.   
Based on the analysis of competing models it appeared that the customer loyalty 
variables, salesperson- and firm-owned loyalty, were in conflict with the salesperson 
influence and performance constructs. One explanation is that the observed variables for 
loyalty were cross loading onto the influence and performance constructs.  In fact, one 
observed loyalty variable, SOL4, appeared to be the most highly offending indicator.   
 
 
FIGURE 5.6 
Full Measurement Model
1,2
 
 
 
 
1
Model fit:  χ
2
 (9) = 54.887, p<.01; RMSEA = .194; GFI = .874; AGFI = .707; NFI = .936; CFI = .946 
2
Correlated error terms have been omitted for the sake of clarity. 
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Although deleting this indicator did substantially improve the overall model fit, a 
decision was made to retain the item based on theoretical grounds.  Specifically, this item 
is more clearly indicative of the salesperson-owned loyalty construct than any other item 
as it states ―I feel greater loyalty toward this salesperson than to Pepsi as a company‖.  
The aim of this measure is to assess the degree of customer loyalty directed toward the 
salesperson versus the selling-firm.  This particular item is at the core of this construct 
and was retained.  The next step was to assess two separate partial models in an attempt 
to identify acceptable fit. 
 
PARTIAL MEASUREMENT MODEL 
 
The poor fit of the overall measurement model appeared to be due to the loyalty variables 
being in the same model with the influence and performance constructs.  The solution 
was to test one partial measurement model with both loyalty variables and perceived 
salesperson control of allowances and a second partial measurement model replacing the 
loyalty variables with the influence and performance constructs. 
The first partial measurement model tested included the constructs and indicators 
for perceived salesperson control of allowances, salesperson- , and firm-owned loyalty.  
Based on the initial analysis, the goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the 
model exhibited marginal fit (χ
2
 (71) = 108.480, p = .003; RMSEA = .063; GFI = .905; 
AGFI = .859; NFI = .934; CFI = .976).  Although the model failed the chi-square test, 
when all fit indicators are considered the model fit is marginal.  As in the previous CFA, 
deleting item 4 from the salesperson-owned loyalty measure would have resulted in an 
acceptable fit.  However, as stated before, this item is central to the construct and was 
thus retained.   Based on this decision, further scale purification was not necessary.  
Across the measurement model factor loadings ranged from .60 to .96.  Composite 
reliability ranged from .88 to .95 while AVE ranged from .64 to .75.  The AVE for each 
construct exceeded its squared covariance with each of the other constructs providing 
evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
The second partial measurement model tested included the constructs and 
indicators for perceived salesperson control of allowances, salesperson-owned influence, 
and salesperson performance with the customer.  Based on the initial analysis, the 
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goodness-of-fit and modification indices indicated the model had a poor fit (χ
2
 (116) = 
252.241, p < .01; RMSEA = .093; GFI = .821; AGFI = .763; NFI = .905; CFI = .946).  
Therefore, further scale purification was necessary.  First, item 5 and 6 from the 
performance measure were deleted as both demonstrated cross loading with the influence 
construct.  Second, items 3, 4, and 5 form the influence measure were removed due to 
cross loading with the other constructs in the model.  The respecified model achieved 
acceptable fit (χ
2
 (48) = 57.437, p = .165; RMSEA = .038; GFI = .938; AGFI = .899; NFI 
= .966; CFI = .994). Across the measurement model factor loadings ranged from .71 to 
.95.  Composite reliability ranged from .92 to .95 while AVE ranged from .75 to .86.  
The AVE for each construct exceeded its squared covariance with each of the other 
constructs providing evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
STRUCTURAL MODEL FITTING 
The hypotheses for this study were tested using structural equation modeling in AMOS 
7, the process and results are presented here.  The hypothesized structural model (see 
Figure 5.7) was assessed and indicated poor fit (χ
2
 (8) = 133.447, p = .000; RMSEA = 
.341; GFI = .812; AGFI = .507; NFI = .325; CFI = .313).  The modification indices 
suggested the addition of direct relationships from salesperson influence to salesperson- 
and firm-owned loyalty and from firm-owned loyalty to salesperson performance with 
the customer.  Although these relationships were not hypothesized, each one was found 
to be theoretically justified and added to the model.  Note that the modification indices 
suggested an additional direct relationship however it was not added to the model as it 
did not align with theory.   
 
 
FIGURE 5.7 
Hypothesized Structural Model
1
 
                           
1
Model fit: χ
2
 (8) = 133.447, p = .000; RMSEA = .341; GFI = .812; AGFI = .507; NFI = .325; CFI = .313 
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The respecified model (see Figure 5.8) indicated good fit (χ
2
 (4) = 4.359, p = 
.360; RMSEA = .026; GFI = .989; AGFI = .945; NFI = .978; CFI = .998).  However, not 
all paths in the model were found to significant.  In particular, two paths, firm-owned 
loyalty and salesperson performance with the customer both leading to selling firm 
performance, were found to be not significant.  This may be due to the fact that selling 
firm performance is measured at the firm-level with the secondary data of sales volume 
while firm-owned loyalty and salesperson performance consists of primary data assessed 
at the customer-level.  There are many factors which contribute to the actual sales 
volume at a given retail location beyond the variables in this study.  In particular, 
competitive activity in the store, the local economy, and the local weather all are thought 
to have a significant impact on overall sales volume of carbonated soft drinks.  This 
realization became apparent at a point in the current study beyond which these variables 
could accurately be controlled.  The next step was to test for the hypothesized main 
effects in the structural model.    
 
 
FIGURE 5.8 
Respecified Structural Model
1
 
                            
Note:  Moderation hypotheses are depicted by dashed lines.  Main effect hypotheses are represented by bold lines.  Additional lines 
were added based on modification indices as described previously. 
 
1
Model fit: χ
2
 (4) = 4.359, p = .360; RMSEA = .026; GFI = .989; AGFI = .945; NFI = .978; CFI = .998 
 
*Supported and significant at the p < .01 level (H1b, H2c, H2d, and H3b were not supported). 
**Supported and significant at the p < .05 level 
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MAIN EFFECT HYPOTHESES 
 
For a summary of hypotheses and support found, see table 5.2 at the conclusion of this 
chapter.  The main effect hypotheses presented in chapter three were tested next using 
the respecified structural model (see Figure 5.8 above).  First, the relationship between 
salesperson influence and salesperson performance with the customer was both positive 
and significant (β = .223, p < .01) and in the hypothesized direction.  Thus, H1a was 
supported.   
Second, the direct relationship between customer investments and salesperson-
owned loyalty was both positive and significant (β = .030, p < .01) and in the effect was 
observed in the hypothesized direction.  Thus, H2a was supported.  Third, the main effect 
from salesperson- to firm-owned loyalty was negative and significant (β = -.230, p < 
.01), however, this effect was not in the hypothesized direction and was found to be 
counter to prior research.  Thus, H2c was not supported.   
Next, the effect of salesperson-owned loyalty on salesperson performance with 
the customer was both positive and significant (β = .170, p < .01) and in found to be in 
the hypothesized direction.  Thus, H2b was supported.  Additionally, the main effect 
from firm-owned loyalty leading to selling firm performance was negligible and not 
significant (β = -.002, p = .811).  Therefore, H2d was not supported.  Finally, the main 
effect between salesperson performance with the customer and selling firm performance 
was not significant (β = .010, p = .304).  Thus, H1b was not supported.  The next step 
was to test the moderation hypotheses.  The moderator testing procedure and results are 
presented next. 
 
MODERATION HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
A multigroup analysis approach was used to assess the moderation hypothesis.  The 
multigroup method prescribes that two groups should be established based a median split 
thereby creating a high and low group based on the moderating variable.  Then two 
models are to be specified and assessed via a chi-square difference test.  One model is 
tested with all hypothesized paths constrained which does not allow the model to vary 
across the high and low groups.  The second model is tested with all hypothesized paths 
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constrained with the exception of the path which is expected to be moderated.  This 
allows the hypothesized path to vary across the high and low groups of the moderating 
variable.  If the chi-square difference is significant, and the effect is in the hypothesized 
direction, then moderation is indicated.  
First, the moderation effect was assessed for the impact of the perceived 
salesperson control of allowances on the direct relationship between customer 
investments and salesperson-owned loyalty.  The multigroup analysis indicated mixed 
results.  The chi-square difference test was completed first.  The constrained model 
indicated χ
2
 (26) = 182.563, p = .000 and the second model with the hypothesized 
moderated relationship free to vary across the two groups indicated χ
2
 (24) = 176.009, p 
= .000.  This result suggested moderation due to a significant chi-square difference at the 
p < .05 level (χ
2
 (2) = 6.554, p = .0377).  Although the effect was observed to be in the 
hypothesized direction, that is high control has a more positive effect than low control, 
only in the high control group was the relationship between customer investments and 
salesperson-owned loyalty significant (p < .01).  Therefore, the multigroup analysis 
indicated partial support for the moderation effect hypothesized in H3a.   
Next, the moderation effect was assessed for the impact of the perceived 
salesperson control of allowances on the direct relationship between salesperson 
influence and salesperson performance with the customer.  The multigroup analysis 
indicated mixed results.  The chi-square difference test was completed first.  The 
constrained model indicated χ
2
 (26) = 182.563, p = .000 and the second model with the 
hypothesized moderated relationship free to vary across the two groups indicated χ
2
 (24) 
= 149.024, p = .000.  This result suggested moderation due to a significant chi-square 
difference (χ
2
 (2) = 33.539, p = .000).  Although the chi-sqaure difference test was 
significant, the effect was not found to be in the anticipated direction.  That is, low 
control has a more positive effect than high control on the relationship between 
salesperson influence and salesperson performance with the customer.  Therefore, the 
multigroup analysis lead to mixed results in regard to H3b.   
Based on indications from prior model testing and the subsequent mixed results 
from the multigroup analysis, a series of post hoc models were specified and assessed for 
additional effects of moderation.  This process resulted in one additional relationship 
exhibiting characteristics of moderation, that is, the direct effect from salesperson-owned 
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loyalty leading to salesperson performance with the customer.  The procedure and results 
are presented next. 
 
 
POST HOC ANALYSIS 
 
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 
 
A second structural model was tested using the same procedure as described previously.  
The alteration in the post hoc model was that the focal relationship for moderation was 
now between salesperson-owned loyalty and the salesperson‘s performance with 
customer.  The question is what impact the customer‘s perception of the salesperson‘s 
control over allowances may have on the ability of the salesperson to leverage loyalty to 
drive individual performance.  The previous model with established fit was used to 
perform a multigroup analysis.  All paths were constrained and as expected the fixed 
model chi-square was the same as before (χ
2
 (26) = 182.563, p = .000).   
The second model differed in that the free parameter was now the path from 
salesperson-owned loyalty leading to the salesperson‘s performance with the customer. 
The chi-square for this model (χ
2
 (25) = 164.355, p = .000) was found to be significantly 
different from the fixed path model (χ
2
 (1) = 18.208, p = .000.  In addition, the effect 
was found to be in the expected direction, that is, high control lead to a stronger positive 
relationship between salesperson-owned loyalty and salesperson performance with the 
customer.  When combined, these results provide strong evidence of a moderation effect.  
In sum, mixed results and partial support for moderation was found across the 
initial structural model.  More definite results were found for moderation in the post hoc 
model.  This leads to a more defined, although not entirely clear, series of relationships 
among the variables.  In an attempt to more fully understand how these variables are 
interacting with one another the decision was made to isolate each relationship along 
with the moderator variable in separate regression models.  The models were tested using 
multiple regression.  The procedure and results are presented next. 
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
 
Hypothesized Moderation 
 
Following the temporal order of model testing in the previous discussion of the structural 
model, the relationship between customer investments and salesperson-owned loyalty 
was tested first for the possible effects of the moderating variable, perceived salesperson 
control of allowances.  The model is represented as: 
 
  SOL = α0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 + β4X3 + β5X4 + ε1 
 
Where: 
 
  SOL = Salesperson-Owned Loyalty 
  X1 = Customer Investments 
  X2 = Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances 
 
Control variables: 
 
  X3 = Customer Familiarity with Allowances 
  X4 = Customer Familiarity with Salesperson 
 
 
Guidelines provided by Hair et al (1998) were adopted to address the possibility of 
multicollinearity.  First, each of the independent variables was mean centered in an 
attempt to mitigate the potential for multicollinearity.  The correlation matrix for all of 
the independent variables indicated that none exhibited correlations above .90 (see Table 
5.1 below).  In addition, the model resulted in variance inflation factors ranging from 
1.018 to 1.203, (all well below the recommended cut-off value of < 10) and tolerance 
ranging from .831 to .982 well above the recommended cut-off of > .10 (Hair et al 1998).   
Taken together, these indicators suggest that multicollinearity was not present in this 
model.  
 
 
TABLE 5.1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations 
  
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Perceived 
Salesperson 
Control of 
Allowances 
(PSCA) 
Salesperson- 
Owned 
Loyalty 
(SOL) 
Firm- 
Owned 
Loyalty 
(FOL) 
Salesperson 
Influence on 
Customer 
(SIC) 
Salesperson 
Performance 
w/ Customer 
(SPC) 
Selling 
Firm 
Performance 
(SFP) 
Salesperson 
Sales Calls 
w/Customer 
(TIME) 
Customer 
Familiarity w/ 
Salesperson 
(REPFAM) 
Customer 
Familiarity w/ 
Allowances 
(DCAFAM) 
PSCA 4.75 1.53 1.00                 
SOL 3.95 1.68 .340** 1.00               
FOL 6.15 1.00 0.02 -0.02 1.00             
SIC 5.14 1.41 .286** .599** .387** 1.00           
SPC 5.76 1.27 .246** .371** .486** .541** 1.00         
SFP 0.01 0.06 .177* .282** 0.02 0.09 .186* 1.00       
TIME 37.65 12.24 .260** .268** -0.04 0.09 0.14 0.08 1.00     
REPFAM 8.29 0.97 .210* .190* .238** .300** 0.15 0.09 .231** 1.00   
DCAFAM 7.56 1.11 0.05 -0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.07 -0.03 .245** .336** 1.00 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Note:  ‘TIME’ consists of the number of sales calls made over timeframe of the study which explains a mean and standard deviation higher than other variables.  
This measure was standardized prior to hypothesis testing.  Standardization of the variable involved subtracting the mean from the original score and dividing by 
the standard deviation. 
 
 
1
0
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The results of the analysis show a positive and significant main effect between customer 
investments and salesperson-owned loyalty (β1 = .038, p < .01) providing additional 
support to the structural model for H2a.  The results of the analysis also show a positive 
and significant interaction effect for perceived salesperson control of allowances on the 
relationship between customer investments and salesperson-owned loyalty (β3 = .015, p < 
.05).  This finding indicates that the perception on the part of the customer that the 
salesperson has a level of control over the allowances has a positive impact on 
salesperson-owned loyalty.  This result provides evidence in support of H3a.   
The interaction was graphed to provide a visual representation of the effects 
taking place among the variables (see Figure 5.9).  However, recall from the multigroup 
analysis of the structural model that in the low control group the relationship between 
customer investments and salesperson-owned loyalty was not significant.  That finding 
taken in combination with the regression analysis may indicate that high perceived 
control is a benefit in terms of loyalty however low perceived control is not as 
detrimental as one may expect. 
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FIGURE 5.9 
Moderating Effect of Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances on  
Customer Investments and Salesperson-Owned Loyalty 
 
 
 
Next, the relationship between salesperson influence and salesperson performance with 
the customer was tested first for the possible effects of the moderating variable, 
perceived salesperson control of allowances.  The model is represented as: 
 
  SPC = α0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 + β4X3 + β5X4 + ε1 
Where: 
  SPC = Salesperson Performance with the Customer 
  X1 = Salesperson Influence on the Customer 
  X2 = Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances 
 
Control variables: 
 
  X3 = Customer Familiarity with Allowances 
  X4 = Customer Familiarity with Salesperson 
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Once again, following the guidelines provided by Hair et al (1998), multicollinearity was 
assessed.  The independent variables was mean centered and the correlation matrix for all 
of the independent variables indicated that none exhibited correlations above .90 (see 
Table 5.1 above).  In addition, the variance inflation factors were present ranging from 
1.069 to 1.309, (all well below the recommended cut-off value of < 10) and tolerance 
ranging from .764 to .936 well above the recommended cut-off of > .10 (Hair et al 1998).   
Taken together, these indicators suggest that multicollinearity was not an issue among 
the predictor variables in the model.   
The results of the analysis demonstrate a positive and significant main effect (β1 = 
.519, p = .000) between salesperson influence and salesperson performance with the 
customer offering additional support for H1a.  The results of the analysis also show a 
non-significant negative interaction effect (β3 = -.126, p = .152) for perceived salesperson 
control of allowances on this relationship.  Thus the moderation hypothesis, H3b, is not 
supported.  Recall that this moderation effect was not supported previously either based 
on the multigroup analysis procedure conducted in AMOS 7.0 which bolsters confidence 
in the overall finding. 
 
POST HOC MODEL 
 
Next, the relationship between salesperson-owned loyalty and salesperson performance 
with the customer was tested for the possible effects of the moderating variable, 
perceived salesperson control of allowances.  The model is represented as: 
 
  SPC = α0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 + β4X3 + β5X4 + β6X5 + ε1 
 
 
Where: 
  SPC = Salesperson Performance with Customer 
  X1 = Salesperson-Owned Loyalty 
  X2 = Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances 
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Control variables: 
  X3 = Customer Familiarity with Allowances 
  X4 = Customer Familiarity with Salesperson 
  X5 = Firm-Owned Loyalty 
 
As with the previous regression model, guidelines provided by Hair et al (1998) were 
used to address the potential for multicollinearity.  Each one of the independent variables 
was mean centered in an attempt to lessen the possibility of multicollinearity.  The 
correlation matrix for all of the independent variables indicated that none of the variables 
exhibited correlations above .90 (see Table 5.1 above).  In addition, the resulting model 
resulted in variance inflation factors ranging from 1.137 to 1.294, (all well below the 
recommended cut-off value of < 10) and tolerance ranging from .773 to .880 well above 
the recommended cut-off of > .10 (Hair et al 1998).   Taken together, these indicators 
suggest that multicollinearity was not an issue among the independent variables in the 
model. 
The results of the analysis show a positive and significant main effect (β1 = .307, 
p = .000) between salesperson-owned loyalty and the salesperson‘s performance with the 
customer which coincides with the finding based on the multigroup analysis conducted 
previously.  The results of the analysis also demonstrate a significant negative interaction 
effect (β2 = -.087, p < .01) for perceived salesperson control of allowances on the 
relationship between salesperson-owned loyalty and the salesperson‘s performance with 
the customer.  This finding indicates that the perception on the part of the customer that 
the salesperson has a high level of control over the allowances actually has a negative 
impact on the salesperson‘s ability to leverage customer loyalty to drive performance.  
This finding is counterintuitive and runs contrary to the overall assumption in this study 
that high perceived salesperson control of allowances is a benefit to the salesperson and 
the selling firm.  The interaction was graphed to provide a visual representation of the 
effects taking place among the variables (see Figure 5.10).  Although this effect flows 
from post hoc analysis and was not set-forth a priori, it provides the other side of the 
control variable coin, that is, the downside of salesperson control.   
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FIGURE 5.10 
Moderating Effect of Perceived Salesperson Control of Allowances on  
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty and Salesperson Performance with Customer 
 
SUMMARY 
The overall results demonstrated a positive and significant main effect between then 
predictor variables customer investments and salesperson influence with salesperson-
owned loyalty.  A positive and significant main effect was also observed between 
salesperson-owned loyalty and salesperson performance.  The data analysis failed to 
show support for the hypothesized main effect between salesperson- and firm-owned 
loyalty, firm-owned loyalty and selling firm performance, or salesperson performance 
and selling firm performance.  Moderation analysis using multiple methods suggested 
when the customer perceives that the salesperson has a high level of control over the 
allowances; the customer‘s loyalty toward the salesperson is enhanced while 
performance is dampened.  This unexpected finding is explored further in the discussion 
presented in the following chapter. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Summary of Hypotheses and Support Found 
 
Hypothesis                                                                                                                     Supported    
 
Main Effects 
H1a:  Salesperson influence positively affects salesperson performance with          Yes** 
         the customer. 
H1b:  Salesperson performance positively affects selling firm performance.          No 
H2a:  Customer Investments positively affect salesperson-owned loyalty.          Yes** 
H2b:  Salesperson-owned loyalty positively affects salesperson performance         Yes** 
         with the customer. 
H2c:  Salesperson-owned loyalty positively affects firm-owned loyalty.          No 
H2d:  Firm-owned loyalty positively affects selling firm performance.          No 
Moderation Effects 
H3a:  High (Low) perceived salesperson control of channel allowances        Yes (High)* 
         enhances (diminishes) the positive effect of customer investments        No (Low) 
         on salesperson-owned loyalty. 
 
H3b:  High (Low) perceived salesperson control of channel allowances          No (High) 
         enhances (diminishes) the positive effect of salesperson influence          No (Low) 
         on salesperson performance with the customer. 
 
**Significant at the p < .01 level (two-tailed) 
*Significant at the p < .05 level (two-tailed) 
1
0
6
 
   
 
107 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the research implications are discussed. First, theoretical implications are 
presented with a focus on channel allowances literature as well as salesperson control 
and cognitive evaluation theory.  Next, managerial implications are explored based on 
the research findings with guidance for sales managers.  Then, a set of limitations in 
relation to the research context and data sources for the current study are put forth.  The 
chapter concludes with consideration given to potential directions for future research in 
the area of downstream channel allowances. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigated the effects, both positive and negative, which may be present due 
to the customer‘s perception of salesperson control over channel allowances.  Key 
variables of the study relating to the customer-salesperson relationship included 
investments of time made by the salesperson in the form of sales calls, the financial 
investment made by the selling firm in the form of channel allowances, customer loyalty 
directed toward the salesperson and the selling firm, the salesperson‘s influence on the 
customer‘s decision making, and the salesperson‘s performance with the customer.   
The findings supported the idea that customer investments have a positive impact 
on achieving salesperson-owned loyalty. Further, this relationship is enhanced when the 
customer perceives that the salesperson holds a high level of control over channel 
allowances.  Also, support was found for the positive impact of salesperson influence on 
salesperson performance with the customer.  However, contrary to expectations, this 
relationship was not moderated by the perception of salesperson control over allowances.  
In regard to additional main effects, the results suggest that, in addition to salesperson 
influence, salesperson-owned loyalty also has a positive impact on the salesperson‘s 
performance with the customer. However, post hoc analysis demonstrated that high 
perceived salesperson control over allowances decreases this positive relationship.  This 
effect was not hypothesized and occurred in opposite direction of what would have been 
expected which begs for explanation while leading to further questions. 
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What is to be made of the finding that high salesperson control is a benefit to 
engendering customer loyalty toward the salesperson but a hindrance to actual 
salesperson performance with the customer?  Recall that data for both salesperson-owned 
loyalty and salesperson performance with the firm was provided by the customer.  
Therefore, regardless of the potential for common method bias, at least in this instance 
the same source is indicating different moderation effects for the same variable across 
two important relationships.   
At first inspection, it would seem at odds that high control is beneficial to loyalty 
while detrimental to performance.  However, there may be a very good theoretically 
grounded explanation for this finding.  In the first instance, salesperson owned loyalty 
benefits from high control just as cognitive evaluation theory would predict.  In the 
presence of high perceived salesperson control the payments are intrinsic to the 
customer-salesperson relationship.  That is, the motivation results from channel 
allowance payments which are perceived to be internal to the relationship as opposed to 
being controlled by some outside force such as a sales manager.  Cognitive evaluation 
theory, as applied to the customer-salesperson relationship in this research, indicates that 
this level of perceived control would increase the customer‘s intrinsic motivation toward 
the relationship with the salesperson.  This would be in line with the theoretical 
framework of set forth in this dissertation.   
The next logical question is why then does the same reasoning not hold true in 
relation to salesperson performance to the customer?  First, it is necessary to why this 
effect may be present before considering it in combination with the prior effect.  An 
explanation as to why high perceived control would be detrimental to salesperson 
performance can be found in the literature on power-dependence theory (Emerson 1962) 
and the possible effects of power within a distribution channel (Gaski 1984).  Power-
dependence theory and related literature would suggest that, in the context of a sales 
exchange, when one partner is more powerful the other partner is more dependent.  
Going further, the dependent exchange partner would likely not appreciate being placed 
in a position dependency on another.  This negative effect would be more pronounced in 
the context of the current study because the customer in a position of dependency for 
money.   
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It is reasonable to expect that the customer would not feel positive about being 
dependent on a salesperson for channel allowances and may respond negatively toward 
that salesperson.  So, if this is the case, why then does the data show that the customer 
responded positively toward the salesperson in terms of loyalty?  It may be that the 
customer loyalty credited to the salesperson is not voluntary but rather coerced.  The 
customer may feel compelled to demonstrate a certain degree of loyalty toward the 
salesperson due to the perception that the salesperson controls the purse strings to the 
channel allowances.  However, when it comes to performance, the customer is less 
inclined to demonstrate a positive opinion.  
 The results of the data analysis failed to support any additional hypothesized 
relationships.  Specifically, the results indicated a significantly negative relationship 
between salesperson- and firm-owned loyalty.  This finding is in contradiction with prior 
research in that the expected ―spill-over‖ effect was not present indicating this finding 
may be spurious and caused by the specific to research context or the adapted measure of 
firm-owned loyalty.  In addition, there was no significant relationship emanating from 
neither firm-owned loyalty nor salesperson performance leading to selling firm 
performance.  This lack of effect is most likely due to the fact that many different factors 
contribute to the selling firm‘s performance with firm-owned and loyalty and the 
salesperson‘s performance being only a small contributing factor. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The salesperson‘s role is to bridge the gap between the customer and the selling 
firm.  This is not always an enjoyable position to hold, however, it can be very influential 
on both sides of the exchange.  The current study inquired as to whether or not 
salespeople should convey to customer‘s a high or low level of control over channel 
allowances.  The actual level of control the salesperson had allowances was not germane 
to this study.  After all, if the customer believes the salesperson has no control over the 
allowances paid by the selling firm, it matters very little how much control the 
salesperson actually has in the situation. 
In regard to channel allowances, there has been a long and ongoing debate as to 
the advantages and disadvantages associated with this practice.  This debate typically 
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centers around whether powerful retailers force manufacturers to pay excessive 
allowances or powerful manufacturers squeeze out competition by offering to pay higher 
allowances than smaller manufacturers are able to afford.  Lost in the determination to 
seek a resolution to this debate has been the impact that channel allowances have on the 
relationship between the customer and the salesperson.  The current investigation did not 
set-out to contribute to the debate or attempt resolution. Rather, the aim of this study was 
to shed some light upon the effect, good or bad, that these allowances have on the 
relationship between a customer and a salesperson. 
Another contribution of this research relates to cognitive evaluation theory.  This 
theory has been used almost exclusively in studies where an individual engaged in a task 
is offered and incentive to perform the given task.  Although scholars sometimes 
disagree, multiple studies have shown that a person‘s level of intrinsic motivation is 
decreased in the presence of an extrinsic motivator, most often money.   
The current research adds an element of nuance to the prior applications of 
cognitive evaluation theory.  That is, the focal activity is not an individual engaging in a 
task but rather two people engaging in a relationship.  More specifically, a customer and 
a salesperson engaged in a business relationship in which money is involved and may or 
may not serve as a source of motivation.  Based on this application of cognitive 
evaluation theory, if the channel allowance is controlled by the salesperson then it is 
internal to the relationship and would not decrease intrinsic motivation.  Since intrinsic 
motivation is not decreased there is no subsequent negative impact to interpersonal 
relationship elements such as loyalty.  However, if the channel allowances are controlled 
by a force external to the relationship (e.g., a sales manager), the customer‘s intrinsic 
motivation may decrease leading to a dampening effect of the feelings of loyalty toward 
the salesperson. 
  
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Discontinuing the use of allowances does not appear to be a viable option in today‘s 
marketplace.  Therefore, it is beneficial to understand the effects of these allowances and 
how managers may better deal with discussing allowances with customers and to what 
extent salespeople should be involved.  A check of the literature for guidance as to the 
 
111 
 
 
level of control a salesperson should have over channel allowances proved unhelpful.  
Prior research (e.g., Hersey and Blanchard 1982) suggest that more experienced 
salespeople would benefit from a high level of control.  However, more recent research 
(e.g., Ahearne, Mathieu, and Rapp 2005) would suggest that less experienced salespeople 
would be most likely to benefit from empowerment.  Of course none of the literature 
provided guidance precisely to the question of salesperson control over channel 
allowances thus highlighting the research gap filled by the current study. 
Based on findings from the present research, it would appear that the saleperson‘s 
perceived control over channel allowances act as a double-edged sword.  On the one 
hand, when a salesperson is perceived to have a high level of control over the allowances 
there is a clear benefit to engendering salesperson-owned loyalty.  On the other hand, 
high perceived control has a deleterious effect on the salesperson‘s ability to the leverage 
that loyalty to increase performance.  The findings suggest that high salesperson control 
benefits loyalty while decreasing performance.   
This leaves managers in the position of either encouraging salespeople to convey 
accountability to customers regarding the allowances or for the salesperson to defer 
accountability to the sales manager.  It is important to note that the findings did not 
suggest low perceived control significantly hindered the salesperson‘s ability to engender 
loyalty, only that high control was beneficial.  One of the focal variables in this study 
was salesperson-owned loyalty (i.e.,customer loyalty directed toward the salesperson as 
opposed to the selling firm).  Prior research suggest that maximizing salesperson-owned 
loyalty may not be desirable for the selling (Palmatier et al 2007).  High customer loyalty 
toward a salesperson would be a potential detriment to the selling firm if the salesperson 
were to leave and join a competitor.  One of the key findings of this research is that 
selling firm‘s can avoid high salesperson-owned loyalty while enhancing the 
salesperson‘s performance simultaneously.  That is, low control decreases salesperson-
owned loyalty while at the same time increasing the salesperson‘s performance.  Thus, 
managers will be best served by training salespeople to deflect decision making authority 
away from him/herself and toward the sales manager.  It is worth noting that this is in 
contradiction with the expected outcome of this study. 
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Therefore, managers may be best served by salespeople with low perceived 
control, which is opposite to the fundamental hypothesis in this research.  With low 
perceived control the manager forgoes maximizing salesperson-owned loyalty while 
minimizing the threat of high perceived control to salesperson performance.  This would 
allow the salesperson to deflect decision making regarding allowances onto others within 
the selling firm (e.g., a sales manager).  
 
LIMITATIONS 
The current research suffers from the following limitations.  First, the intentions of the 
channel allowances in regard to this research are unknown.  The payments made by the 
selling firm combine slotting allowances, display allowances, and promotional 
allowances into a single quarterly payment.  It is unknown if, or to what degree, the 
purpose of the channel allowances would have on the relationships examined in this 
research.  It would be valuable from the sales manager‘s perspective to know whether or 
not this element makes a difference in the way channel allowances are perceived by 
customers.  Existing literature tends ot focus on either slotting allowances or promotional 
allowances exclusively.  When different types of allowances are included in a single 
study, there is no distinction made as to the intentions of the allowance being paid.  That 
limitation is shared in the current research as well. 
Second, only a single retail channel (i.e, convenience stores) was represented in 
the study.  Based on access to customers and secondary data, this limitation was 
unavoidable.  However, there are benefits related to control based on this limitation.  For 
example, due to the consistency of channel partners participating in the survey research 
there is no need to sacrifice sample size in order to control for various channels of 
distribution.  However, the downside is that it remains unresolved as to whether large 
grocery store chains, drug store chains, department stores, etc. would all demonstrate 
comparable results with this study.   
Third, only a single product category (i.e., carbonated soft drinks) was included 
in this study.  As with the different retail stores mentioned, product category effects are 
not accounted for in the study.  Would the results found in the current study be consistent 
across the various departments of the grocery store?  Would the results have been 
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different across product categories outside of consumer goods?  These questions remain 
unanswered.  Product category is an important distinction to make because channel 
allowances have long ago moved beyond the grocery retail segment.  In a pre-study 
interview with a senior key account salesperson was asked a question about slotting 
allowances he replied by saying ―Slotting allowances are primarily a retail grocery 
practice‖.  In fact, that has not been the case for over a decade.  Allowances of all type 
have moved beyond grocery and into many areas including online retailing.  In part, the 
proliferation of channel allowances is due to the FDA‘s lack of enthusiasm for 
controlling or halting the practice.  Based on the government‘s lack of interest and the 
marketplace incentives, channel allowances are certain to grow exponentially across 
virtually all areas of the global economy.  In sum, this limitation is a significant one. 
Finally, and as discussed to some extent previously, there was a clear difference 
in terms of power and dependence between the selling firm and the retail customers 
included in this study.  That is, the selling firm was the powerful partner in the 
relationship while the customer was the most dependent.  This limitation may have 
contributed to the unexpected finding that high perceived control over channel 
allowances decreases the salesperson performance with the customer.  In other words, the 
customer does not like to be dependent on a salesperson representing a more powerful 
selling firm.  Given the current study, there is no way to know if this power difference 
contributed to the observed effect.  In fairness, it would be extremely difficult to find a 
scenario in which power was equal between the customer and salesperson in a business-
to-business exchange.  This limitation indicates the need for more controlled 
experimental research in the area of channel allowances. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The practice of selling firms paying channel allowances continues to grow, however, 
research in this area is lacking.  Therefore, future research in the domain of channel 
allowances is ripe with opportunity.  First, there is an existing control in the marketplace 
based on government regulations.  That is, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms 
(BATF) has banned the practice of paying or requiring channel allowances for alcoholic 
products.  However, the rest of the consumable goods market is regulated by the Food 
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and Drug Administration (FDA) and the FDA has not banned this practice for the sale of 
other consumer goods.  What this means is that a carbonated soft drink salesperson is 
competing for the same space in the retail grocery store that the beer salesperson desires.  
However, the soft drink salesperson can offer to pay the retailer for the space while the 
beer salesperson cannot.  Regardless of the inherit lack of fairness this may create, a 
more interesting question is what effect does the presence of a channel allowance have 
on the relationship between these two salespeople and the retail customer?      
A second direction for future research regarding channel allowances is to study 
different effects based on the intended purpose of the allowance.  For example, does it 
matter if a salesperson is offering to pay for shelf space versus offering to pay for a 
promotion?  One may infer that a promotion would be of more benefit to the retailer if it 
is designed to generate store traffic.  It may benefit the selling firm and the retailer to 
structure channel allowances around promotions and make shelf or display space a 
requirement as part of the promotion.  This could effectively eliminate slotting 
allowances, display allowances, and pay-to-stay fees by making these elements part of 
the promotional allowance agreement.  Future research may address these questions and 
provide a more definitive answer. 
Third, it would be beneficial to attempt to generalize the findings of this study 
across other retail context and product categories.  While replication in a different 
context may not be advantageous in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, researchers in the 
future would be wise to examine multiple channel allowance phenomena across a variety 
of retail channels and product categories. Much of the existing literature, including the 
current study, is embedded on the retail consumer goods segment.  More specifically, 
many of the studies involve consumable goods sold in grocery stores.  It would benefit 
the area of channel allowance research to convey a message that this is not just a grocery 
store phenomenon.  In fact, the practice has been growing rapidly beyond the grocery 
segment for the past two decades.  Hopefully, future research will be able to keep up with 
the pace. 
Finally, as suggested in the discussion on limitations, researchers will find it 
challenging to identify a real world customer-salesperson relationship in which channel 
allowances are involved and power between the exchange partners is equal.  This signals 
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the need for future experimental research regarding channel allowances.  Only within the 
confines of a highly controlled experiment may researchers have the ability to set power 
and dependence equal in one condition while allowing it different across two others.  
Assuming differential effects are found in the experimental setting, a series of follow-up 
studies would be needed to generalize the findings to actual customer-salesperson 
relationships.  Without doubt, this would require a great deal of effort but would prove 
exceedingly beneficial to channels of distribution researchers as well as those interested 
in channel allowances and power-dependence theory. 
 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation has taken the initial step in understanding the effects of the customer‘s 
perception of the salesperson‘s control over channel allowances in a business-to-business 
exchange.  However, much work is still needed in this regard.  Sales managers and 
salespeople alike may be well advised to convey a low level of salesperson control over 
channel allowances, especially if the objective is to maximize both customer loyalty 
toward the firm and salesperson performance simultaneously.  With a continuing lack of 
government regulation, researchers seeking rewarding and fruitful opportunities for 
future research will find riches in the area of channel allowances as this practice 
continues to expand across the marketplace.   
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